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"Eflectronic] discovery [is] profoundly changing lawyering. "I
"What it means to be a lawyer will change rapidly in the years to come.
"E-Discovery [is] a morass..3
"Massive sanction for e-discovery failures offers lessons for lawyers. ' 4
I. OVERVIEW: THE NEW AGE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
Electronic discovery has arrived. And with a profound impact on attorneys,
judges, businesses and individual litigants.5 Electronically-stored information
(ESI) is now the form for more than ninety percent6 of all information created
1 Chris Mondics, Ediscovery Profoundly Changing Lawyering, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
June 8, 2008, at D1.
2 George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?,
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 6 (2007).
3 Martha Neil, Litigation Too Costly, E-Discovery a "Morass, "TrialLawyers Say, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/litigation-too-costlyediscoverya_
morasstrial lawyerssay/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Sylvia Hsieh, Massive Sanction for E-Discovery Failures Offers Lessons for Lawyers,
LAWYERS USA, Feb. 25, 2008, news.
5 See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008)
(determining that defendants waived any privilege or work-product protection for 165
electronically stored documents); In re Sept. 1 th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (imposing severe sanctions on law firms and their insurer clients); Doppes v.
Bentley Motors, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (holding that the trial court
failed to impose a default judgment sanction for e-discovery abuse and remanding with orders to
do so).
6 See SHIRA SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: CASES
AND MATERIALS 42 (2009) ("Ninety-two percent of the new information was stored on magnetic
media, mostly in hard disks." (emphasis added) (quoting Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How
Much Information? 2003 (Oct. 27, 2003), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/
how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm)); Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative
Approaches to Cutting and Shifiing the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 114 (2007) (citing The Sedona Conference, The Sedona
Guidelines: Best Practice Guidelines & Commentary for Managing Information & Records in
the Electronic Age 1 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2005), http://www.thesedona
conference.org/content/miscFiles/RetGuide200409.pdf [hereinafter Sedona Conference, Best
Practices]).
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and stored-whether business transactions, financial arrangements or social
interactions.7 This technology revolution is generating an evolution in the legal
arena.8 Specifically, new technology has transformed modem discovery-the
litigation mechanism for unearthing and sharing relevant information. 9
Lawyers who adroitly work through the complexities of e-discovery ably
serve their clients and the courts--"secur[ing] . . . just, speedy, and
inexpensive" litigation.10 Those who miss its hidden issues and nuances may
alter the outcomes of their cases, simple and complex, and at times face costly
sanctions.'l Indeed, e-discovery is changing the way businesses do, or should
do, their business and the way lawyers lawyer. 12 Yet, for a time, in-house
counsel, private firm attorneys and businesses nationwide walked largely in the
7 See, e.g., Sarah Merritt, Comment, Sex, Lies, and Myspace, 18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
593, 595 (2008); Dennis Kennedy, Get the (Instant) Message, Dude!: By Phone or PC,
Messaging Offers Several Advantages, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2008, at 40; Major R. Ken Pippin,
Consumer Privacy on the Internet: It's "Surfer Beware", 47 A.F. L. REv. 125, 125 (1999).
8 See Monica A. Fennell, Judge William Lee: Leading By Example, RES GESTAE, Sept.
2008, at 46 (describing United States District Judge Lee's approach to embracing the societal
technological revolution with a parallel technological revolution in the courts).
9 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) ("Liberal discovery is
provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of
litigated disputes.").
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see Chris Mondics, Firm Tracks Evidence Generated by E-Devices;
Clients are Considering Suits, or Fear Being Sued, PHILADELPtHA INQUIRER, Feb. t, 2009, at Dl
(discussing how an e-discovery vendor can help businesses avoid legal disputes, narrow the
issues, more accurately value cases, and ultimately seek the truth); see also Lorraine v. Markel
Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007) (discussing methods of properly admitting various
types of ESI into evidence).
1 See infra Section II.B.; Charles S. Fax, Inadvertent Disclosure ofESl and "Reasonable
Care": A Close Look at Victor Stanley, LMG. NEWS, Fall 2008, at 20 ("E-discovery can be
dangerous for lawyers.").
For important commentary on problems in traditional discovery, see Lawrence J. Fox et
al., Ethics: Beyond the Rules: Historical Preface, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 691 (1998); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635 (1989); Wayne D. Brazil, Civil
Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems andAbuses, 1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (1980); Wayne D. Brazil, Views From the Front Lines: Observations by
Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 217 (1980);
Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
12 See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (discussing
the advent of records retention policies).
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dark.' 3 The news headlines in the epigraph reflect the heightened anxiety about
this evolving litigation landscape.'
4
In 2005 the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure affirmed the federal judiciary's commitment to "full disclosure"
during civil discovery, declaring that "potential access to [relevant] information
[should be] virtually unlimited."' 5  To better achieve this goal, the Rules
Committee addressed the increasing complexity of discovery of ESI.t6 In 2006,
with Supreme Court approval, federal rule-making bodies amended the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 7 to create a rules regime to guide e-discovery
practice.' 8 Described in depth in Section IH.C., that new regime generally
addresses early attention to e-discovery issues, the production format and
procedure for location and disclosure of ESI, the handling of ESI that is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense, a mechanism for
dealing with inadvertently produced ESI and a limited safe harbor for e-
discovery missteps.
Most important, the new federal e-discovery rules regime sends a clear signal
to attorneys and businesses: plan ahead, assess benefits and burdens and
watch out for sanctions!
13 See Deni Connor, Study Proves E-Discovery Confusion, NETWORK WORLD, June 12,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 1131194; Deni Connor, Half of Businesses Not Meeting
Federal E-Mail Discovery, Retention Rules, NETWORK WORLD, July 5,2007, available at 2007
WLNR 12960966.
14 See supra text accompanying notes 1, 3-4.
Is See Summary of the September 2005 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure [hereinafter Report of the Judicial Conference Committee] 22,
http://www.uscors.govl rulesReportsfSTO9-2005.pdf (citing a 1999 Federal Rules Advisory
Committee goal to develop "mechanisms for providing full disclosure in a context where
potential access to information is virtually unlimited and in which full discovery could involve
burdens far beyond anything justified by the interests of the parties"); see also Wakabayashi v.
Hertz Corp., 66 Haw. 265, 275, 660 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1983) ("The Hawaii Rules of Civil
Procedure, like the federal procedural rules, reflect a basic philosophy that a party to a civil
action should be entitled to the disclosure of all relevant information in the possession of
another person prior to trial, unless the information is privileged." (citations omitted)).
16 See infra Sections II.C. and III.C.
17 "Federal Rules" or "Rules."
18 DAHLSTROM LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC., THE NEW E-DIscovERY RULES 5 (2006). The
Advisory Committee of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure submitted proposed amendments
to the Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, who then submitted the
proposed amendments, unchanged, to the Judicial Conference. Id. After unanimous approval
by the Judicial Conference, approval by the Supreme Court and no Congressional action to the
contrary, the rules became effective on December 1, 2006. Id; Letter from Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, Jr. to Rep. J. Dennis Hastert and Vice-President Dick Cheney (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf.
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The federal amendments and the series of five opinions in Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC 19 (on which the amendments were in part based), however, have
not resolved all e-discovery issues. 20 Ambiguities and gaps persist. For
instance, the rules are largely silent on the duties of attorneys and clients to
create and implement policies that govern preservation and destruction of
potentially litigation-relevant ESI.2' They also provide only limited guidance
on the allocation of sometimes oppressive costs of e-discovery and the extent of
cost-benefit proportionality considerations; and, they are silent on specific
criteria for sanctions.22
Even with these limitations, twenty-three state courts have adopted the
federal e-discovery rules regime in whole or in part, including California,
Alaska, Arizona, Utah and Montana.23 Six more states are currently
considering e-discovery rules amendments, including Washington and New
Mexico.
24
The Hawai'i State Judiciary has yet to speak on e-discovery issues through
new rules or appellate decisions. As a consequence, Hawai'i attorneys, judges
and businesses lack tailored e-discovery guidance. Practitioners must
necessarily look elsewhere for direction. 25 Yet, other courts' rulings form a
19 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake 11); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,
217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake 1). Although the Zubulake opinions added
significantly to the e-discovery common law prior to amendment of the Federal Rules, this
article discusses the Zubulake opinions only to the extent that they clarify or add to the
discussion herein.
20 See The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles Addressing Electronic Document
Production, Second Edition iv (June 2007), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did
=TSCPRINCP2nd ed 607.pdf ("The [Federal] [R]ules do not answer many of the most
vexing questions judges and litigants face. They do not govern a litigant's conduct before suit is
filed, nor do they provide substantive rules of law in such important areas as the duty of
preservation or the waiver of attorney-client privilege."); Jason Krause, E-Discovery Gets Real:
Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Still Leave Many Questions About Discovery
of Electronic Evidence, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2007, at 44.
2 Cf SCrONDLIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 76-77 (discussing common law and Federal Rule
37(e)'s limited and implicit guidance); see also David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primerfor
Judges, 2005 FED. CTs. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (2005) (discussing various types and sources of data
for possible preservation).
22 See infra Sections IV.B. and C.
23 Kroll Ontrack, State Rules & Statutes E-Discovery and Computer Forensics,
http://www.krollontrack.com/library/stateruleskrollontrack-dec2009.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2010).
24 Id.
25 See Amy K. Thompson-Smith et al., Coming to Terms with Electronic Discovery, 9 HAw.
B.J. 4 (Feb. 2005); Memorandum from Keith K. Hiraoka, Roeca, Louie & Hiraoka, LLP, to Eric
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patchwork of decisions. And, as mentioned, the federal e-discovery rules
regime is silent or incomplete on some key issues.
To better explore the significance of the absence of e-discovery rules
guidance in litigation practice consider Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies
AG. 26 Before federal e-discovery rule amendments the Eastern District Court
of Virginia faced classic ESI destruction in Rambus-a patent dispute marked
by e-discovery mistakes and misconduct, including misuse of the attorney-
client privilege, cost-allocation disputes, spoliation of potential evidence,
hidden incriminating emails, faulty document retention and destruction policies
and sanctions.27
Rambus brought a patent infringement claim against Infineon.28 Infineon
responded with affirmative defenses and counterclaims.29  To support its
counterclaims Infineon sought to compel Rambus' production of information
on the development and implementation of Rambus' program for retention and
destruction of ESI.30 Rambus maintained that its purging policy itself was
attorney-client privileged.3' In earlier motions-with evidence from internal
emails-the court established that, over several "shred days," Rambus
intentionally destroyed relevant non-privileged material (including ESI) under
its document purging policy.32 As a result, the court granted in part Infmeon's
motion to compel by applying the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege and work-product immunity doctrine because of Rambus' spoliation
of potential evidence.33
Rambus explained that "it instituted its document [destruction] policy out of
discovery-related concerns ... [about] the legitimate purpose of reducing
search and review CoStS. ' ' 34  The court rejected Rambus' "undue cost"
explanation and announced that "destruction of documents of evidentiary value
K. Yamamoto, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law (Dec. 1,2008) (on file
with authors); see also Hawaii Firm Hosts Shakacon Conference, PAC. Bus. NEWS, 2008
WLNR 10730163 (June 6, 2008) (stating that Hawai'i is a growing market for guidance
regarding e-discovery, evidenced by a conference "to inform business owners, government and
military officials and information technology executives about... compl[iance with] stricter
laws regarding ... electronic discovery").
26 222 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Va. 2004).
27 See id.
21 Id. at 282.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 284.
31 Id. at 285-87.
32 Id. at 286-87, 291,297. Emails in parallel actions revealed that before Rambus filed suit
in 2000, it held a 1998 "Shred Day"--deliberately destroying 20,000 pounds of documents
(over two million pages), including many potentially relevant documents. Id. at 284, 286.
" Id at 285-87.
34 Id. at 295.
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... is fundamentally at odds with the administration of justice. ' '35 The court
then granted Infineon's motion to compel and further admonished Rambus for
its deployment of its ESI management policy to destroy potentially relevant and
incriminating information.36 It then authorized Infineon to conduct discovery
relevant to appropriate sanctions.37 Rambus aptly illustrates the range of
common problems of e-discovery that have prompted state judiciaries to adopt
the 2006 federal amendments or similar rules.38
In Hawai'i, the recent saga over reportedly adult-oriented emails and racial
jokes by a former CEO of the Hawai'i Tourism Authority (HTA) provides a
39glimpse into the potential complexity of e-discovery in even "simple" cases.
A state audit of the HTA CEO's business email account publicly revealed the
emails.4 ° Outraged residents pressed for his firing while Hawai'i leaders stood
in his defense. 4' The CEO resigned, foreclosing sticky termination-related
litigation.42 If a civil suit had ensued, e-discovery might have encompassed
discovery of thousands of emails over several years from backup tapes, cellular
phone and text messages records, personnel records and intra-office e-
memoranda-with attorneys and judges struggling each step of the way over
the general scope of e-discovery, the relevance of specific requests, the timing
and scope of parties' duty to preserve, the validity of e-destruction procedures
and the allocation of e-discovery costs. Not to mention the looming prospect of
sanctions for missteps.
Indeed, e-discovery has arrived in Hawai'i and is here to stay. The questions
today, with an eye towards tomorrow, are: whether to adopt the federal e-
discovery rules regime, and if so, how to tweak the rules to fit local needs.
Circuit Court discovery rulings rarely reach appellate courts, so guidance from
the rules themselves, their commentary and scholarly insights will be crucial.43
The time is ripe for the Hawai'i legal community to even-handedly assess the
burdens and opportunities of handling e-discovery in light of "the needs of the
3 Id. at 298.
Id. at 299.
37 Id.
38 See Sheri Qualters, States Launching E-Discovery Rules: Costs, Confusion Spark the
Trend, 30 NAT'L L.J. 1, Oct. 8, 2007.
39 See Rick Daysog, Scandal at Tourism Authority, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 19,2008,
at C2.
40 id
41 Rick Daysog, Key Support Evaporated for Former Tourism Chief, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Oct. 10, 2008, at Al.
42 Robbie Dingeman, Search to Begin for New Tourism Authority CEO, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Oct. 11, 2008, at B6.
43 See Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored
Information, vii (Richard Van Duizend ed., 2006), http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJ
GuidelinesFinal.pdf (citation omitted).
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case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, ... the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues," and potential sanctions.
44
This article endeavors to assist the Hawai'i courts and the public and private
bars in assessing the need for an e-discovery rules regime by suggesting
incorporation of the federal e-discovery rules regime into the Hawai'i Rules of
Civil Procedure.45 With this prospect in mind, it also suggests ways to fill gaps
in the rules and clarify ambiguities in the federal approach.46 More specifically,
in terms of clarification and gap-filling, the article addresses hidden dimensions
to the mandate of early attention to e-discovery issues (including attorney,
client and expert attention to technological intricacies in anticipating litigation
and preparing discovery plans); cost-benefitproportionality (including infusing
the proportionality principle throughout the litigation and at times shifting e-
discovery costs); and sanctions avoidance (including assessing tricky aspects of
the duty to preserve ESI, crafting retention and destruction policies, deploying
litigation holds and anticipating an affirmative sanctions rule). Finally, the
article aims to assist in-house counsel and businesses in planning pro-actively
for e-discovery even before litigation arises.
We therefore proceed in Part II by broadly explaining the ways that e-
discovery has changed the litigation landscape. In Part III we list other state
judiciaries that have adopted the Federal Rule amendments. Most important,
and drawing support from federal magistrate judges, we suggest that the
Hawai'i state courts adopt the federal e-discovery rules regime, and we provide
a detailed description of the 2006 Federal Rules amendments for adoption. In
Part IV we draw upon commentary, other discovery rules and Hawai'i appellate
discovery decisions to suggest ways that Hawai'i rulemakers (through
44 HAW. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii).
45 The Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Haw. 325, 341, 104 P.3d 912, 928 (2004)
(quoting Gold v. Harrison, 88 Haw. 94, 105, 962 P.2d 353, 364 (1998)). Changes to the
Federal Rules are often, after study, incorporated into the Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure.
46 This article is not merely a practice guide for attorneys to adjust their form file to account
for amended Federal Rules; there are already many of those. See, e.g., Dean Gonsowski, The
Maturity of E-Discovery Reflects a Greater Needfor Law Firms to Begin Building Successful,
Repeatable Processes and Taking Risk Out of the Equation Whenever Possible, 27 No. 4 LEGAL
MGMT. 26 (2008); Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the Discovery of ESI Since
December 1, 2006, 14 Ricw. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2008); Raymond J. Peroutka, Jr., Beyond the Quill:
Best Practices in the "E-Discovery Age", 26-7 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32 (2007); Sedona
Conference, Best Practices, supra note 6; Sergio D. Kopelev & Michael R. Bandemer, You
Want Me to Do What?: A Practical Look at the Question of Proper Preservation of
Electronically Stored Information in Today's Business Litigation Environment, 14 NEV. LAW.
24 (2006).
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commentary) and Hawai'i courts (through published decisions) can
productively clarify ambiguities and fill important gaps in the federal regime.
II. THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
Out of the ferment of the technology revolution, the e-lawyer and e-client
have arisen. Emails, text messages, Google searches, online shopping, e-
banking, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, with more on the horizon and nary a
piece of paper. Litigation's proverbial "smoking gun" now often inhabits the
electronic ether.47 Electronic communications are changing the way that
disputes arise and are adjudicated as e-discovery dramatically alters litigation
opportunities, burdens and responsibilities.48
A. Electronically Stored Information and the Transformation of Discovery
E-discovery is different from ordinary discovery in four major ways. First,
the sheer volume of ESI is exponentially greater.49 Social and business
interactions are now recorded electronically in multiple locations and often
stored---even automatically-in more than one medium.50 These multiple
media invariably store duplicates or slightly different versions that can only be
located or distinguished from each other with great difficulty and expense.51
Previously much of this information was not recorded at all.
52
As one scholar of law and technology recently observed, "[iln a small
business, whereas formerly there was usually one four-drawer file cabinet full
of paper records, now there is the equivalent of two thousand four-drawer file
cabinets full of such records [stored electronically]. 53 Every month large
organizations send and receive up to three hundred million email messages.54
Most organizations, including local governments, now have the capacity to
47 E.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 n.6 (2005) (referring to
destruction of ESI labeled "smoking gun"); see RALPH C. LOSEY, E-DISCOVERY: CURRENT
TRENDS AND CASES 33 (2008) ("The smoking guns in courtrooms today are found in computers,
not filing cabinets.").
48 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(Zubulake 1) (stating that cost-shifting, which is more likely to arise in the e-discovery era, "may
effectively end discovery").
49 See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 22.
5' See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 40.
51 See Paul & Baron, supra note 2, at 110; Van Duizend, supra note 43, at v.
52 See Lynn Mclain, The Impact of the First Year of the Federal Rules and the Adoption of
the Maryland Rules: Foreword, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 315, 315 (2008).
53 Paul & Baron, supra note 2, at 13.
54 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 22-23.
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store several terabytes of information at five hundred million typewritten pages
per terabyte. 5
Of all electronic business records, eighty percent are never converted to
paper.56 Unearthing this buried ESI is complicated and costly. The problem is
magnified because most companies do not have effective ESI retention and
destruction policies (for automatic file management) or lack sufficient
employee training and technical support.51
Second, a great deal of ESI is unintelligible. 58 Some databases and programs
create and store data so that the content is only comprehensible with software
that is not readily available.59 As a result, litigants regularly face costly delays
in negotiating production formats and incur expert consultant expenses in
assisting judges to resolve sticky disputes.60
Third, ESI includes unrecorded metadata----"data about data."6 Metadata are
computers' automatic recordings of "the date [files] w[erej created, its author,
when and by whom it was edited, what edits were made, and, in the case of e-
mail, the history of its transmission.' '62 Prior to electronic storage, there was no
other way to consistently and reliably know details of the creation, amendment
63
and deletion of information.
Fourth, ESI is both nearly indestructible and extremely fragile. 64 Deleting
ESI with the click of a mouse does not destroy it. 65 The information remains on
the computer hard-drive and is only permanently eliminated by physical
5 Id.
56 LOSEY, supra note 47, at 33.
57 Id; Beyond Records Management: Leveraging Your Process to Reduce E-Discovery
Costs, INSIDE COUNSEL, Sept. 2009, at 28.
58 See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 23.
59 Rachel Hytken, Note and Comment, Electronic Discovery: To "hat Extent Do the 2006
Amendments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 880 (2008).
60 See Jason Krause, In Search of the Perfect Search, 95 A.B.A. J. 38 (2009) (discussing the
potential insufficiency of keyword searches and need for experts); Conrad J. Jacoby, E-
Discovery Update: Producing Spreadsheets in Discovery-2008, Law and Technology
Resources for Legal Professionals (Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.llrx.com/columns/ediscovery
spreadsheets.htm (discussing negotiations over the format of producing ESI); see, e.g., United
States v. O'Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,
250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008).
61 Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining
Metadata, 13 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 4 (2007); Hytken, supra note 59, at 879.
62 Ronald Hedges et al., Taking Shape: E-Discovery Practices Under the Federal Rules,
SN085 ALI-ABA 289, 391 (June 25-28, 2008).
63 Id.
64 See Mazza et al., supra note 6, at 4.
65 Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation:
Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 337 (2000).
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destruction of the hardware or overwriting by the computer system.66 To the
extent that data have been merely deleted by a computer user they are often
recoverable, although usually only through costly computer forensics.67
Paradoxically, ESI is also extremely fragile.68 "Deleting" information marks
it for later elimination by computers' automatic process for overwriting aging
files. Therefore, while "deletion" is not necessarily permanent, electronic files
and accompanying metadata maybe altered or destroyedby computers' routine
pre-programmed operations. 69 This can result in the "deliberate" destruction of
ESI-in the sense of ordinary overwriting--even though no person specifically
intended to destroy the particular ESI.7
These four major dimensions of ESI are transforming the ways attorneys
seek information and conduct discovery in a wide array of cases.
B. E-Discovery Trouble
Without clear guidance, e-discovery is a walk in the dark. It also allows
some attorneys and litigants to jigger the litigation process and, at times, exploit
others.7' E-discovery issues arise prior to and during all stages of litigation,
including the moment a dispute morphs into a possible legal claim; at an early
conference to form a discovery plan; during discovery requests and responses;
in motions for preservation, to compel production and for protective orders; and
upon contemplation of sanctions.
E-discovery is often more expensive than ordinary discovery because of the
large volume, hidden features and frequent need for an army of support staff
and specialists.72 Costs of preservation can be exorbitant, even prior to
litigation when it is unclear if a lawsuit will be filed.7 3 Cautious in-house
counsel tend to advise clients to absorb the high costs of preserving wide-
ranging ESI to avoid steep sanctions for improper destruction, even though
neither the rules nor court pronouncements clearly delineate when the
6 See Hytken, supra note 59, at 879-80.
67 See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 n.6 (2002).
68 See Kenneth J. Withers, "Ephemeral Data" and the Duty to Preserve Discoverable
Electronically Stored Information, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 349, 378 (2008).
69 See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
70 See id.
71 See Qualters, States Launching E-Discovery Rules, supra note 38 ("Lawyers are figuring
out how to turn electronic discovery into a sideshow."). See generally Thomas C. Tew,
Electronic Discovery Misconduct in Litigation: Letting the Punishment Fit the Crime, 61 U.
MLAMI L. REV. 289 (2007).
72 See generally Mazza et al., supra note 6.
73 See Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-litigation
Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 381, 386-87 (2008).
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preservation duty begins and what preservation actually entails.74 Indeed,
"unrestricted and undefined [ESI] preservation obligations" at times function as
an unseen force that drives litigation.75
The high volume and complexity of ESI also expands pre-production time
for attorneys who must cull sensitive and discovery immune material from
massive computer files.76 The possibility of finding damaging "hidden" ESI-
that would not have been recorded by non-electronic means-invites
exceedingly aggressive production requests.77 The availability of metadata, in
particular, allows discovery of information that was previously unavailable;
although often at great expense through computer forensics and at a possible
invasion of privacy.78 It is common for producing parties to become frustrated
by the cost and tedium of pre-production review and for requesting parties to
become frustrated by what appears to be unnecessary delay.79
Some attribute high e-discovery costs to the adversarial nature of litigation,
businesses' deficient ESI management policies or poor technology--or all
three.80 Others cite inevitable disagreements over the format of ESI production
even among cooperative parties and attorneys.8 ' Regardless of the causes,
ordinary discovery problems are often magnified by e-discovery.
82
74 LOSEY, supra note 47, at 32; see also Grimm et al., supra note 73, at 385-88 (noting that
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) cost-benefit factors technically do not apply before a complaint is filed, but
suggesting that it should guide practices nonetheless); Paul & Baron, supra note 2, at 12.
75 Hytken, supra note 59, at 886 (quoting Andrew M. Scherffius et al., Conference on
Electronic Discovery, Panel Four: Rules 37 and/or a New Rule 34.1: Safe Harbors forE-
Document Preservation and Sanctions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 71, 77 (2004)).
76 See id. at 881.
77 See id
78 See Favro, supra note 61, at 4 (stating that metadata is unique to ESI); Bradley H. Leiber,
Current Development 2007-2008: Applying Ethics Rules to Rapidly Changing Technology:
The D.C. Bar's Approach to Metadata, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 893, 893 n.2 (2008) ("[T]he
D.C. Bar analogizes mining for metadata to looking through a briefcase that was inadvertently
left in opposing counsel's office."); Lucia Cucu, Note, The Requirement for Metadata
Production Under Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co.: An Unnecessary Burden for
Litigants Engaged in Electronic Discovery, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 221, 229-32 (2007)
(discussing the high cost and difficulty of producing metadata).
79 See Conrad J. Jacoby, E-Discovery Update: Recognizing Hidden Logistical Bottlenecks
in E-Discovery, Law and Technology Resources for Legal Professionals (Apr. 24, 2007),
http://www.llrx.com/columns/fios16.htm.
go See John Bace, Gartner RAS Core Research, Cost of E-Discovery Threatens to Skew
Justice System (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.h5technologies.com/pdf/gartner0607.pdf.
81 See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery:
The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO
L. REv. 347, 356 (2008).
82 See Qualters, States Launching E-Discovery Rules, supra note 38 ("[S]maller firms are
wrestling with the issue of cost, such as searching the country for experts on long-obsolete
programming languages.").
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E-discovery troubles also arise in the form of court imposed sanctions for e-
discovery missteps. Those sanctions aim to compel compliance with e-
discovery obligations, deter others from misconduct, restore prejudiced parties8 3
and "plac[e] the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully
created the risk."84 They are often imposed when there is a lesser degree of
culpability than "bad faith," including "cognizable prejudice to the injured
party.
85
Sanctions against attorneys include significant fines, public pronouncements
of wrongdoing and referrals to bar association ethics commissions.8 6 Attorney
and party e-discovery misconduct sometimes lead to default judgments or case
dismissals;87 adverse jury instructions;88 bars to further discovery;89 imposed
waiver of confidentiality, attorney-client privilege and work-product
immunity;9° and payment of experts' and attorneys' fees and costs.91
Prior to and shortly after federal e-discovery rules were amended, courts
imposed e-discovery sanctions in sixty-five percent of cases where sanctions
were sought.92 E-discovery sanctions are a hot topic-they are at play in one
quarter of all ESI-related cases. 93
83 Thomas Y. Altman, Achieving an Appropriate Balance: The Use of Counsel Sanctions
in Connection With the Resolution of E-Discovery Misconduct, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 3
(2009).
84 Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., 2006 WL 1409413, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23,
2006).
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., In re Sept. 11 th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81 (D.N.J. 2006); Metro. Opera Ass'n. v. Local 100,
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union, 212 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
87 See, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mack, 270 Fed. Appx. 372 (6th Cir. Mar. 17,2008); S.
New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47986 (D. Conn. June 23,
2008).
88 See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48309 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007); Anderson v. Crossroads Capital Partners, L.L.C., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1867 (D. Minn. Feb. 10, 2004).
89 See, e.g., R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 251 F.R.D. 520 (S.D. Cal.
2008).
90 See, e.g., Casio v. Papst (In re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG Litig.), 550 F. Supp. 2d
17 (D.D.C. 2008).
91 See, e.g., Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2720 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
7, 2009).
92 See Hytken, supra note 59, at 879 (describing events prior to 2006); Arthur F.
Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct, 77 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 537, 561 n.98
(2009) (referring to a study of cases from 1997-2007).
93 Sheri Qualters, 25 Percent ofReportedE-Discovery Opinions in 2008 Involved Sanctions
Issues, NAT'L L.J. (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 202426805975&rss
=newswire (reporting that twenty-five percent of the opinions issued in the first 10 months of
2008 involved sanctions for mishandling electronic discovery).
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C. Overview of Federal E-Discovery Rules Amendments
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
conceded in 2005 that then-extant federal discovery rules provided "inadequate
guidance" on the e-discovery rights and obligations of parties and attorneys. 94
The Committee concluded that Federal Rules needed to be amended to avoid a
vague "patchwork" of case law, local rules and varying practices-collectively
inconsistent, confusing, burdensome and even debilitating.95 The Committee
further cautioned that, "[u]nless timely action is taken to make the federal
discovery rules better able to accommodate the distinctive features of electronic
discovery, those rules will become increasingly removed from practice, and
similarly situated litigants will continue to be treated differently depending on
the federal forum."
96
As a result, the Committee proposed rule amendments in 2005 with several
main goals: to reduce costs and burdens for litigants, to increase uniformity, to
instruct judges "to participate more actively in case management when
appropriate" and to reduce unfair power differential among litigants of
disparate resources.97 In 2006, after careful vetting by the Judicial Conference
Committee, the Supreme Court approved amendments to the e-discovery rules
and Congress tacitly accepted them.
98
A summary in thematic categories of the 2006 federal e-discovery rules
amendments will be useful. The amended rules suggested for adoption by the
Hawai'i state courts will be discussed in greater detail in section III.C.
Amended Federal Rules 16, 26(a) and 26(f) specifically account for "early
attention" to e-discovery issues.99 Automatic initial disclosure of documents
useful to support a claim or defense, under amended Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A),
94 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 23.
95 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 23.
96 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 24.
97 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 24.
98 Thomas Y. A]lman, The "Two-Tiered" Approach to E-Discovery: Has Rule 26(b)(2) (B)
Fulfilled its Promise?, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, Appendix (2008).
Several organizations have created formal principles and rules that detail "proper" e-
discovery conduct, anticipating or supplementing the federal rules. See Sedona Principles
Addressing Electronic Document Production, Second Edition, supra note 20; National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Rules Relating to the Discovery
of Electronically Stored Information (2007), http://www.law.upenn.edu/blil/archives/ulc/
udoera/2007_final.pdf; American Bar Association, Section of Litigation, Civil Discovery
Standards (Aug. 2004), http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscovery
standards.pdf.
99 FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26(a) & 26(0; see also Sedona Principles Addressing Electronic
Document Production, Second Edition, supra note 20.
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specifically includes ESI.'0 Federal Rule 26(f), which covers party discovery
conferences, requires parties to discuss ESI preservation, ESI production
formats and issues and agreements relating to inadvertently produced attorney-
client privileged and work-product immune ESI.101 Federal Rule 16(b), which
governs court scheduling orders pursuant to Rule 26(f) conferences, directs
judges to include party agreements, in particular, those that relate to inadvertent
disclosure of privileged and immune materials.1
0 2
Amended Federal Rule 26(b)(2), referring to the scope of discovery,
explicitly allows a party to refuse to disclose ESI because of undue burden or
cost.10 3 However, if a refusing party seeks a protective order or a requesting
party moves to compel the ESI, then the refusing party bears the burden of
showing undue burden or cost.'°4 Finally, regardless of a refusing party's
showing, the amended rule appears to authorize courts to order discovery
within general Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality limitations.10 5
Amended Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B) articulates what should happen when
privileged or immune materials are inadvertently produced.'0 6 Initially, a
producing party may notify all recipients and seek retrieval. 0 7 In these
instances, recipients must immediately cease further disclosure and either return
or destroy the material or produce it under seal to a court to challenge the claim
of protection.1
08
Amended Federal Rule 33(d) permits a party to answer interrogatories by
specifying responsive electronically stored business records.' 09 Amended
Federal Rule 34(a), relating to the scope and procedure of producing
documents, permits general discovery of "any designated documents or
electronically stored information."" 0  Further, in the absence of a party
agreement as to the format of production, amended Federal Rule 34(b) requires
that a respondent produce ESI as it is normally maintained or in a reasonably
usable form and it need not produce it in more than one form."'
'00 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (Rule 26(a)(1)(B) was renumbered as Rule 26(a)(l)(A) as part
of the 2007 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is consistently referred to
as Rule 26(a)(1)(A) herein).
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0.
'0 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
103 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2); see LOSEY, supra note 47, at 86.
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
105 Id.
106 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
107 id.
108 Id.
109 FED. R. Civ. P. 33(d).
"0o FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(l)(A).
II. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii)-(iii).
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Finally, amended Federal Rule 37(e) provides a safe harbor from sanctions
for the destruction of ESI where a party's "routine, good-faith" system of ESI
management destroyed otherwise discoverable ESI." 12
The next two parts of this article address the Hawai'i courts' adoption of the
federal e-discovery rules regime and offer suggestions for clarification and to
fill gaps in that regime.
III. ADOPTING THE FEDERAL E-DISCOVERY RULES REGIME
A. Twenty-Three Other States'Adoption of the Federal Regime
To date, twenty-three states have adopted the federal e-discovery rules
regime in whole or in part, including the western states of California, Alaska,
Arizona, Utah and Montana. 13 In addition, several states that have not yet
adopted new rules themselves are closely watching those states that have."14
Shortly after the federal amendments took effect in December 2006, the
Montana Supreme Court adopted the federal e-discovery rules regime in 2007
"to provide more specific guidance [for discovery of ESI]."'"15 After eighteen
months of observation of the Federal Rules and adoption of rules by dozens of
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (Rule 37(f) was renumbered as Rule 37(e) as part of the 2007
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is consistently referred to as Rule
37(e) herein).
113 Kroll Ontrack, supra note 23 (containing a color-coded map of the United States and
identifying twenty-three states that have adopted at least the basics of the federal e-discovery
rules regime as of October 2009). In 2007 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Rules Relating to the Discovery of Electronically
Stored Information for state courts. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, supra note 98. The "uniform rules" follow almost verbatim the Federal Rule
amendments. Substantively, they are the same. Some of the relatively minor differences
include a 21 day meet and confer requirement for counsel and an attempted definition,
somewhat ambiguous, of "electronic discovery." See id.; LOSEY, supra note 47, at 108-09. The
state courts that have adopted a new e-discovery regime generally appear to be following the
Federal Rule amendments, with minor tweaking, rather than the uniform rules. See Kroll
Ontrack, supra note 23. One apparent reason is that the Federal Rule amendments are now
supported by a growing body of interpretive federal court decisions. Especially because
Hawai'i state courts rely upon federal court decisions interpreting Hawai'i rules that are
modeled after corresponding federal rules, see, e.g., Moyle v. Y & Y Hyup Shin, Corp., 118
Haw. 385, 403 n.14, 191 P.3d 1062, 1080 n.14 (quoting Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 532,
445 P.2d 376, 380 (1968)), we suggest adoption of the federal rules regime.
114 Thomas Y. Allman, Annotated List of State Rules of Civil Procedure: State by State
Summary of E-Discovery Efforts, http:/lwww.discoveryresources.org/library/case-law-and-
rules/state-rules/annotated-list-of-state-rules-of-civil-procedure (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
11 In re Proposed Revisions to the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure With Respect to
Discovery of Electronic Information, No. AF 07-0157 (Mont. Feb. 28, 2007) (adopting new
civil rules for e-discovery).
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other states, California adopted rules that closely track the federal regime, with
minor tweaks to add greater detail (likely due to its codified procedural
system)." 6
Some Arizona attorneys are calling for clarification and gap-filling by courts
and their state rules committee after adopting the federal regime in 2008.117
Other practitioners look both to the federal e-discovery rules regime and other
sources for guidance in state courts." 
8
A sense of urgency is compelling states in every region to seriously consider
amending their rules to address e-discovery.1 9 They are doing so with the
recognition that rule amendments are only the beginning. What remains is
judicial clarification and pronouncements on key issues and cooperation among
courts, attorneys and businesses in developing workable best practices tailored
to local needs. It is now Hawaii's turn.
B. Hawai'i State Courts: Adopting the Federal Regime
Hawai'i courts lack a rules regime and developed case law to enable litigants
and attorneys to prophesize about e-discovery disputes and shape their practices
to avoid or at least productively handle them. 120 Judges, too, need a system of
rules to guide their otherwise piecemeal determinations. The initial question,
116 Assem. B. 5, 2009 Leg. (Ca. 2009); e.g., CAL. CODE Civ. P. § 1985.8(0(1) ("Absent
exceptional circumstances, the court shall not impose sanctions... for failure to provide [ESI]
that has been lost, damaged, altered, or overwritten as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system." (emphasis added)); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)
("Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions... for failing to provide
[ESI] lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system."
(emphasis added)).
117 See Robert G. Schaffer & Anthony Austin, New Arizona E-Discovery Rules, 44 AZ
Attorney 24, 26 (Feb. 2008) (discussing the failure of rules to mandate particular practices for
handling e-discovery early in litigation).
118 E.g., Jeffrey S. Follett, The ChiefJustices'E-Discovery Guidelines: Worth A Look, 51
B.B.J. 9 (May/June 2007) (citing Van Duizend, supra note 43).
119 See Kroll Ontrack, supra note 23.
120 Federal Magistrate Judges Kurren and Chang recently observed that while e-discovery is
important, it has not yet been the basis of major disputes in the cases at the United States
District Court for the District of Hawai'i. Interview with The Honorable Kevin S.C. Chang,
Magistrate Judge of the District of Hawai'i, Haw. (Sept. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Magistrate
Chang Interview]; Interview with The Honorable Barry Kurren, Magistrate Judge of the District
of Hawai'i, Haw. (Sept. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Magistrate Kurren Interview]. One possible
reason is the new federal e-discovery rules regime. See Magistrate Chang Interview; Magistrate
Kurren Interview; cf In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, 2007 WL 3172642
(Bankr. D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2007) (involving destruction of ESI in breach of a duty to preserve).
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therefore, is: should the Hawai'i courts adopt the federal e-discovery rules
regime?
121
Empirical assessment of the impacts of the federal e-discovery rules
amendments is unfinished. 122 And federal and state court litigation differ in the
types of cases processed and, on the federal side, in the significant usage of
magistrate judges for discovery management.
Nevertheless, the amendments to the 2006 federal e-discovery rules provide
a solid foundation for handling evolving e-discovery issues. There are three
broad indicators that point to the overall importance of the federal e-discovery
rules regime for state courts, including Hawaii's. First, as mentioned, many
state courts are incorporating the federal regime into their rules of civil
procedure with apparently salutary initial results. Second, the somewhat sparse
terrain of published federal court opinions interpreting and applying the federal
e-discovery rules do not reveal significant problems with the rules
themselves-although they do reveal certain ambiguities and gaps that we
address in the following section.
123
Finally, informal interviews with federal magistrate judges in Hawai' i124 and
Califomia' 25 highlight the importance of the e-discovery rules on the front-lines
of federal litigation. For United States Magistrate Judge Edward Chen, of the
District Court of the Northern District of California,
E-discovery presents unique problems as well as opportunities in the context of
pretrial discovery. Issues such as the need to balance the costs of disrupting
normal business operations against the need to preserve evidence, the ability
through search technology to run efficient searches of digital documents, and
other issues warrant specific rules.
126
Magistrate Judge Barry Kurren of the District Court of Hawai'i encourages
Hawai'i and other states to adopt the federal e-discovery rules regime. 27 He
anticipates that the lack of uniform state and federal court practices could
121 As of this writing, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has convened a special committee of
judges, attorneys and law professors to consider adoption of new e-discovery rules.
122 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyondthe Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV.
321 (2008).
123 See, e.g., United States v. O'Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008) (interpreting
Federal Rules 34(b) and 37(e) and commenting on the difficulty of production without parties'
earlier discussion and agreements).
124 Magistrate Chang Interview, supra note 120; Magistrate Kurren Interview, supra
note 120.
125 E-mail from The Honorable Edward M. Chen, Magistrate Judge of the Northern District
of California (Sept. 14,2009,08:21:00 HST) (on file with authors); id. ("E-discovery is the new
future of civil discovery. Carefully crafted rules, knowledgeable attorneys and parties, and
hands-on judges are essential.").
126 Id.
127 Magistrate Kurren Interview, supra note 120.
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become problematic, especially because the rules' disparity is large.1
28
Magistrate Judge Kevin S.C. Chang, also of the District Court of Hawai'i,
agrees about the importance of uniformity and adds that clear guidance is
crucial for state courts because of those courts' heavy caseload. 129 Magistrates
Kurren and Chang also note that the federal regime has made Hawai'i attorneys
and businesses more cognizant of e-discovery issues and facilitated more
cooperative ESI-related litigation. 3"
The impending e-discovery litigation challenges, the largely salutary impact
of the Federal Rule amendments and the insights of federal magistrate judges
collectively argue for Hawai'i courts' adoption of the federal e-discovery rules
regime-with an important caveat. Adoption of the package of the federal e-
discovery rules marks the beginning. The Hawai'i courts' clarification of
ambiguities and filling of gaps in the new rules-potentially along the lines we
suggest-is what will likely be needed to productively shape e-discovery
practice in Hawai'i. We therefore suggest that Hawai'i courts adopt the 2006
amendments to the federal e-discovery rules summarized in detail below. And
we also carefully consider ways that commentary and court rulings might
clarify ambiguities and fill the important rules regime gaps delineated in
Part IV.
C. The Federal E-Discovery Rules Regime
1. Early attention to e-discovery issues: Rules 16(b) and 26(a) and W9
In the federal e-discovery rules regime, early attention to e-discovery issues
by all litigation players is required through the combination of Rule 26(f) (party
and counsel discovery conferences) and Rule 16(b) (scheduling orders). 131 This
early attention requirement encourages attorneys to facilitate agreements for
cost-effective production and avoid inadvertent waiver of attorney-client
privilege and work-product immunity.132 After a Rule 26(f) conference and
party-submitted discovery plans, courts' scheduling orders often incorporate
128 Magistrate Kurren Interview, supra note 120.
129 Magistrate Chang Interview, supra note 120.
130 Magistrate Chang Interview, supra note 120; Magistrate Kurren Interview, supra
note 120.
'1 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 16(b) and 26(f); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee's
note (2006) (stating that Rule 26 was amended to clarify that ESI must be included in initial
disclosures).
132 Report from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report] 24-25, 36 (May 27, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Reports/CV05-2005.pdf; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (2006);
FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2006).
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agreements regarding ESI production issues and prevention of inadvertent
waiver of privilege or immunity.
133
For the purposes of developing a proposed discovery plan and increasing
"possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case," Rule 26(f) meetings
are now to encompass discussion of ESI preservation, ESI production
(including file format), prospects of cost-shifting and maintaining privileges or
immunities in the event of inadvertent ESI production.13 Furthermore,
amendments to Rule 16(b)(5) and Form 35 encourage parties to detail proposed
e-discovery plans to the court.
135
Federal Rule 16(b) was "[re-]designed to alert the court to the possible need
to address the handling of discovery of [ESI] early in the litigation if such
discovery is expected to occur."' 36 Paralleling Rule 26(f), federal e-discovery
scheduling orders now may also "provide for disclosure or discovery of [ESI]"
and any party agreements regarding claims of privilege or immunity that may
arise after inadvertent production. 137 In its notes to Rule 26(f), the Advisory
Committee directed that exparte preservation orders should only be entered in
exceptional circumstances because doing so might interrupt the balance of
competing needs to preserve ESI and allow litigants to continue business
operations.1
38
The current Hawai'i rules do not specify the timing of any discovery
conference and the dates for generation of a discovery plan.' 39 Assuming that
the Hawai'i procedural rules will not be amended to match the precise
scheduling conference and discovery conference and plan requirements of the
Federal Rules, then the simpler proposal of the Uniform Law Commission
makes sense: within 21 days after all parties' appearance, the parties' counsel
are to confer and, if ESI is likely to be sought, to submit to the court an e-
discovery plan within 14 days after conferring. 1
40
"' See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
114 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(2).
135 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 24.
136 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee's note (2006).
13' FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee's note
(2006) (suggesting that parties make various agreements regarding this issue); FED. R. Civ. P. 26
advisory committee's note (2006).
138 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
139 See HAW. R. Civ. P. 16 & 26 (no specification of discovery conference or plan deadlines);
see also HAw. CIR. CT. R. (no specification of discovery conference or plan deadlines).
140 Rule 3. Conference, Plan, and Report to the Court.
(a) Unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders, not later than [21]
days after each responding party first appears in a civil proceeding, all parties that have
appeared in the proceeding shall confer concerning whether discovery of electronically
stored information is reasonably likely to be sought in the proceeding, and if so the parties
at the conference shall discuss:
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2. Production format and procedure: Rules 33(d) and 34(a) and (b)
Prior to the 2006 amendments to the federal e-discovery rules, many courts
encountered difficulty in stretching Rule 34 to encompass ESI as a "document,"
especially ESI that is unintelligible when separated from the database that it is
stored on.14 ' All types of ESI now fall within the ambit of amended Rule
34(a).'42 Amended Federal Rule 34(a)(1) pertains to the production of
documents and things, permitting discovery requests to "test[] or sample...
[ESI] . . . stored in any medium" and be translated, if necessary, by the
respondent. 143 Federal Rule 26(f) now directs attorneys to discuss the "forms in
which [ESI] should be produced" prior to requesting court assistance.'44
Paragraph (b) of Rule 34 permits requesting parties to "specify the form" of
production and authorizes responding parties to object to those specifications
and describe the form it intends to employ. 145 If a party does not request a
specific format for ESI and there is no controlling court order or party
agreement, then the respondent "must produce [ESI] in... forms in which it is
ordinarily maintained or [forms that are] ... reasonably usable ... ,146
Federal Rule 33(d) now authorizes parties to respond to interrogatories by
producing business records in electronic form. 147  The responding party,
however, "must ensure that the interrogating party can locate and identify it 'as
readily as can the party served,' and that the responding party ... give the
interrogating party a 'reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect' the
information.'
148
(b) If discovery of electronically stored information is reasonably likely to be sought in
the proceeding, the parties shall:
(1) develop a proposed plan relating to discovery of the information; and
(2) not later than [14] days after the conference under the subsection (a), submit to the
court a written report that summarizes the plan and states the position of each party as to
any issue about which they are unable to agree.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 98.
141 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note (2006).
142 Id.
143 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) advisory committee's note (2006)
(stating that, upon objection, "parties must meet and confer under Rule 37(a)(2)(B) in an effort
to resolve the matter before... a motion to compel" is filed).
144 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(3).
14' FED. R. CIrv. P. 34(b).
'46 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).
14' FED. R. Civ. P. 33(d); see also Conrad J. Jacoby, E-Discovery Update: Pushing Back
Against Hardcopy ESI Productions, Law and Technology Resources for Legal Professionals
(Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.llrx.com/columns/hardcopyesi.htm (suggesting that production of
ESI in hard-copy format is becoming less appropriate and less desired among attorneys).
14' FED. R. Civ. P. 33(d) advisory committee's note (2006).
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3. Discovery of ESI that is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost: Rule 26(b)(2)(B)
The addition of subsection (b)(2)(B) to Federal Rule 26 responds to a major
difference between e-discovery and ordinary discovery. While many computer
systems make ESI more accessible and less costly, others do the exact
opposite-user-friendly properties do not always carry over for easy
preservation and production. 149 Simply put, "[a] party may have a large amount
of information on sources or in forms that may be responsive to discovery
requests, but would require [substantial burden or cost for] recovery,
restoration, or translation before it could be located, retrieved, reviewed, or
produced."' 150 These burdensome sources include:
back-up tapes ... that are often not indexed, organized, or susceptible to
electronic searching; legacy data that remains from obsolete systems and is
unintelligible on the successor systems; data that was "deleted" but remains in
fragmented form, requiring a modem version of forensics to restore and retrieve;
and databases that were designed to create certain information in certain ways
and that cannot readily create very different kinds or forms of information.'
5
'
Accordingly, amended Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) now allows a respondent to
avoid the hardship of production if requested ESI is "not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. ' 152 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule
26(b)(2) are instructive, although the rule itself is unclear about the process for
designating material "not reasonably accessible." The Advisory Committee
Notes outline a two-tier process for ESI production'-first "reasonably
accessible" ESI and second (only if necessary), "not reasonably accessible"
ESI.
154
As to the second tier, a respondent must "identify, by category or type, the
sources" that it claims are "not reasonably accessible" with "enough detail to
149 See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 31.
150 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 42. Producing parties are often able to
locate sources that may contain responsive information but are unable to "produce" them
"without incurring substantial burden or cost." Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132,
at 42.
11 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 42.
1512 FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
153 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 42-43. Some argue that the two-tier
system deters proper production of ESI by allowing parties to "self-designate" what is not
reasonably accessible. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 44. Others argue that
the two-tier system encourages storage of ESI in a way that is not reasonably accessible to avoid
production in the event of litigation. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 44.
'4 FED. R. CW. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006); see Hytken, supra note 59,
at 890 (stating that first-tier materials are presumed to be discoverable).
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enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the
discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified
sources."155 Designated "second-tier" materials are presumed "not reasonably
accessible."'1 56 Without more, this is the end of the process.
If a requesting party challenges the "second-tier" designation with a motion
to compel (or a respondent moves for a protective order), then the respondent
bears the burden of showing that the materials sought are indeed unduly
burdensome or costly.15 7 The requesting party may refute this showing by
proving "good cause" for production. 158 A court may then order production in
entirety or with conditions, considering Rule 26(b)(2)(C) cost-benefit
factors. 159 As to the latter assessment, the Advisory Committee Notes to
Federal Rule 26 instruct courts to independently evaluate whether burdens and
costs can be "justified [by] the circumstances of the case."' 60 The Advisory
Committee Notes list seven "appropriate considerations":
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce
relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available
on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant,
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further
information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the
parties' resources.' 61
The two-tier system does not diminish any preservation obligation. 162 It only
addresses the production of preserved information.
4. Maintaining attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity
despite inadvertent production: Rules 26(b)(5)(B) and 2669(4)
Federal rulemakers intended for Rule 26(f) conferences to encourage e-
discovery agreements.1 63 They also designed Rule 26(f) to encourage parties to
avoid inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product
... FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006).
156 Hytken, supra note 59, at 890.
157 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006).
158 Hytken, supra note 59, at 890; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see LOSEY, supra note 47, at 110.
160 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006).
161 Id.
162 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 44.
163 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(o advisory committee's note (2006); see LOSEY, supra note 47, at 82
(citing ADAm COHEN & DAvID LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE (Supp.
2007)).
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immunity-particularly because the "volume and dynamic nature" of ESI may
make it difficult to identify privileged and immune material before
production. '64
Under amended Federal Rule 26(f), party agreements to prevent waiver of
privileged and immune material often include "quick peeks" or "clawbacks.' 65
"Quick-peek" agreements allow a requesting party a "quick peek" at a broad
range of the opposing party's ESI. 66 Requests are then tailored to relevant and
desired ESI without a producing party's waiver of privilege or immunity. 
67
"Clawback" agreements involve a producing party's liberal disclosure of ESI
and authorization for the producing party to "claw" ESI back as it becomes
noticeably attorney-client privileged or work-product immune. 168  The
Committee encouraged party agreements in anticipation of this issue,
acknowledged that federal courts cannot order quick peeks or clawbacks
without a party agreement and declared that courts should only enter an ex
parte order in exceptional circumstances.
69
Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides a procedure for parties who claim
privilege or immunity after inadvertent production.' 70  A party that
inadvertently produced privileged or immune materials may notify any party
that received the information and the basis for its protection.' 71 Then the
notified party "must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified
information and any copies it has [and] must not use or disclose the information
until the claim [for protection] is resolved .... ",,'7 The Federal Rule does not
address whether production waives protection, but only provides an avenue for
claiming after-the-fact protection. 73 Rule 26(b)(5)(B) is intended to work with
the new Rule 26(f), which encourages party agreements on these issues.174
'64 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
165 Id; see Colonel John Sienietkowski, Note From the Field: E-Discovery Amendments to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Celebrate First Anniversary, 2007 ARMY LAW. 77, 80 (2007).
16 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 36.
167 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 36.
168 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 36.
169 FED R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (2006); FED R. CIv. P. 26(f) advisory
committee's note (2006).
170 FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
171 Id.
1"72 id.
17' FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee's note (2006).
174 Id. ("Agreements reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders including such agreements
entered under Rule 16(b)(6) may be considered when a court determines whether a waiver has
occurred." (emphasis added)).
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5. Sanctions and a safe harbor for loss of ESI: Rule 37(e)
Federal Rule 37(e) 175 provides a safe harbor from sanctions for ESI "lost" as
a "result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system."' 176 Responding parties who satisfy the safe harbor requirement of
routine, good-faith loss cannot be sanctioned "[albsent exceptional
circumstances."1 17 Rule 37(e) is highly unusual. It is the only federal rule that
expressly prohibits imposition of sanctions.
IV. CLARIFYING AND SUPPLEMENTING E-DISCOVERY RULES FOR HAWAI'I
PRACTICE
Adoption of the federal e-discovery rules regime will provide helpful
guidance to Hawaii's attorneys, judges and businesses. As mentioned,
however, the amended federal e-discovery rules are ambiguous on some issues
and leave significant gaps in others. We now analyze three major potentially
problematic areas of e-discovery and offer rulemakers, judges and attorneys
suggestions for clarification and gap-filling. More specifically, we address
hidden dimensions to the mandate of early attention to e-discovery issues
(including attorney, client and expert attention to technological intricacies in
anticipating litigation and preparing discovery plans); cost-benefit
proportionality (including infusing the proportionality principle throughout the
litigation and shifting e-discovery costs); and sanctions avoidance (including
assessing tricky aspects of the duty to preserve ESI, crafting ESI retention and
destruction policies, deploying litigation holds and anticipating an afftrmative
sanctions rule). Our suggestions by no means exhaust the field of possibilities,
but do reflect our best assessment to date.
A. Early Attention for Efficient ESI Exchanges
Federal courts, 178 state courts, 179 practitioners'8 ° and procedural scholars' 8'
widely agree that "front-loading" the handling of e-discovery issues prevents or
175 See supra note 112 (noting that Rule 37(f) was renumbered as Rule 37(e) as part of the
2007 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is consistently referred to as
Rule 37(e) herein).
176 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (emphasis added).
177 Id.; cf FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006) (stating that the rule "does
not affect other sources of authority to impose sanctions or rules of professional responsibility").
178 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 26.
179 See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26-37; see also Uniform State Laws, supra note 98, at 4-6.
180 See, e.g., LosEY, supra note 47, at 7-8.
181 See, e.g., Withers, supra note 68, at 378 (stating that an early discovery conference is
essential for e-discovery, especially concerning time-sensitive data).
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diffuses later e-discovery disputes.' 82 Litigation costs may decline and case
valuation may become more predictable as attorneys organize and present their
positions on e-discovery issues early to opposing parties and the court.' 3
While there may be unnecessary anticipatory expenses, we agree generally with
these views and emphasize the importance of early attention to e-discovery by
Hawaii's judges, attorneys and businesses.
The early attention framework of amended Federal Rules 16 and 26(a) and
(f) is designed to avoid wasteful e-discovery and concomitant disputes.' The
federal regime, however, does not particularize what kind of "early attention" is
required or even desirable prior to the Rule 26(f) discovery conference and
Rule 16 scheduling conference. With an eye on long-term costs and benefits,
we highlight three practices that Hawai'i attorneys and litigants would likely
find productive at the outset of litigation.
First, based on recent federal court e-discovery experience, businesses' early
creation of detailed ESI management policies is crucial. Generally, the greater
the detail of parties' ESI preservation protocols (i.e. specifying the individuals
and computer systems involved), the more productive the Rule 26(f) discovery
conference (or in Hawai'i courts, the discretionary discovery conferences) and
the fewer the e-discovery problems later.
18 5
Second, federal court experience also indicates that productive discovery
conferences require attorneys' familiarity with their clients' ESI systems.
Computer specialists are essential. They help attorneys assess and represent
whether their clients' ESI is accessible and calculate costs for review,
.- 186
formatting and production. Attorneys' early preparation might also focus on
knowledge of: (1) the physical location of duplicates and back-up ESI; (2) the
difficulty and cost of accessing particular ESI (and in what formats); (3) the
ESI's sensitivity to overwriting or deletion; (4) the method their client uses to
employ a litigation hold on scheduled ESI destruction; and (5) the use of data
sampling to prepare a discovery plan.' 87 Early cooperation and understanding
182 LOSEY, supra note 47, at 82-84 (citations omitted).
183 See Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding Unprofessional Conduct
in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983,998-99 (2009) (encouraging early and cooperative e-
discovery conferences).
184 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 15, at 26-27.
185 See Michael D. Berman, Avoiding Discovery into Discovery: ESI Lessons Learned,
LITIGATION NEWS, Fall 2008, at 22; Correy E. Stephenson, Clients Take Reins in E-Discovery,
Mo. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 13, 2008 ("Companies are trying to be as efficient as possible .... In a
perfect world, the attorneys will be involved even before litigation occurs."); Isom, supra
note 21, at 5.
186 See Berman, supra note 185, at 22.
187 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UPS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(Zubulake V). See generally Sedona Conference, Best Practices, supra note 6 passim
(discussing best practices).
2009 / ELECTRONIC DISCOVERYRULES IN HA WAI'I
is also likely to promote parties' willingness to follow their attorneys'
sometimes seemingly burdensome advice and help avoid later sanctions-in the
immediate case and, even better, in future cases as well.188
Finally, based on federal court e-discovery experience, attorneys and parties
are encouraged to devote early attention to the risk of inadvertently producing
attorney-client privileged or work-product immune ESI. Prior to the surge of
e-discovery, courts variously and inconsistently interpreted the waiver-effect of
"inadvertent production"--all disclosures were waivers, only some disclosures
were waivers, and no disclosures were waivers. 189 Amended Federal Rule
26(b)(5)(B), addressing inadvertent production, does not determine the extent
to which inadvertent production constitutes waiver. It only sets up a procedure
for raising and responding to the issue.' 90 The Hawai'i circuit courts will likely
need to fill this gap by resorting to the Hawai'i Supreme Court's waiver rulings
or federal court practices on inadvertent production in ordinary discovery. 191
B. Express Cost-Benefit Proportionality Analyses
Early attention is helpful for evaluating benefits and burdens of e-discovery
in a particular case. But early attention alone does not resolve how to allocate
costs in a way that both is consistent with the purposes of discovery and
accounts for e-discovery's often heavy financial toll and business disruption.
The established proportionality principle for ordinary discovery provides apt
guidance on this question.
188 See Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, supra note 122, at 331.
189 See Elkton Care Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P'shp v. Quality Care Mgmt., 805 A.2d 1177, 1183-85
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
190 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee's note (2006).
191 See Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City & County of Honolulu, 102 Haw. 465,486, 78 P.3d
1, 23 (2003) (quoting Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993)). In
determining whether inadvertent production constitutes waiver, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has
held that "consideration is given to all of the circumstances surrounding the disclosure." Id.
at 486, 78 P.3d at 22 (quoting Alldread, 988 F.2d at 1434). The court identified five key
factors: "(1) the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure; (2) the amount of
time taken to remedy the error; (3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and
(5) the overriding issue of fairness." Id. (quoting Alldread, 988 F.2d at 1434). Federal courts
employ the same approach to determine waiver of inadvertently produced e-discovery. See,
e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc., v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 259 (D. Md. 2008) (citing
McCafferty's, Inc., v. Bank of Glen Burie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 167 (D. Md. 1998)).
As discussed, early attention to waiver may take the form of"clawback" or "quick peek"
agreements. Although, in federal courts, these agreements sometimes result in disputes
themselves. Magistrate Chang Interview, supra note 120; see also Hopson v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 (D. Md. 2005) (suggesting that non-waiver
agreements may be ineffective for third-parties).
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1. Cost-benefit proportionality generally
E-discovery's potential for distorting substantive outcomes because of
exorbitant costs highlights the salience of the principle of proportionality for e-
discovery-that is, assessing probable long-range costs and benefits as a guide
to discovery conduct. 92 The shift toward electronic transmittal and storage of
information exacerbates imbalances of litigation power among individual,
business and government litigants and sometimes affects case outcomes.1 93 The
federal e-discovery rules regime, however, is ambiguous on the crucial issue of
cost-benefit proportionality. Some attorneys and judges look elsewhere for
general rules that "superimpose the concept of proportionality on all behavior
in the discovery arena.' ' 94  Others tend to overlook proportionality
considerations altogether. At best, federal courts inconsistently employ the
general proportionality principle for e-discovery1 95 With this in mind, we
suggest that the Hawai'i courts expressly embrace cost-benefit proportionality
as a key guiding principle for Hawai'i e-discovery practice.
Hawai'i Rule 26(b)(2) and its federal counterpart instruct judges and
attorneys in ordinary cases to make proportionality determinations when
creating an overarching discovery plan. 196 The rule requires that courts limit
discovery at the outset of litigation according to the following criteria:
192 See Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (D. Md. 2008)
("[C]ompliance with the 'spirit and purposes' of these discovery rules requires [attorneys to]
cooperat[e] ... [and] avoid seeking discovery the cost and burden of which is disproportionally
large to what is at stake in the litigation.").
193 See Salvatore Joseph Bauccio, Comment, E-Discovery: Why and How E-Mail is
Changing the Way Trials are Won andLost, 45 DuQ. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (2007) (discussing
the differences between e-discovery and traditional discovery, especially the amount of
resources needed for proper e-discovery and the increase of settled cases due to high costs).
194 Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic
Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 253, 256-57 (2001) (quoting In re Convergent Tech.
Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
'9' See Withers, supra note 68, at 377 ("[C]ourts have not expressly applied proportionality
considerations analogous to Rules 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) of the [FRCP] to the context of
preservation ....").
196 HAW. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2):
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted under these
rules shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has
had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties'
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of
the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
(emphasis added); accord FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
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"[whether] the burden or expense... outweighs its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues."' 97 The rule
contemplates active judicial management and a comprehensive cost-benefit
proportional discovery plan to guide information location and production and to
minimize later disputes over burdens and costs.1
98
In practice, judges, attorneys and scholars regularly overlook Rule 26(b)'s
broad proportionality mandate-an important oversight. Instead, many
apparently choose to consider proportionality narrowly under Rule 26(c), which
authorizes protective orders to limit specific discovery for reason of
"annoyance, embarrassment, oppression . . . undue burden or expense" or
unfair competitive advantage.' 99 Rule 26(c) provides some guidance because it
is, in part, concerned with burden and expense.20 0 But the protective order rule
addresses the handling of individual discovery disputes (e.g., objections to a
request for specific documents) and not overarching discovery plans.20' Even
an "umbrella protective order" in a complex case simply allows parties early on
to designate materials "confidential" without engaging in proportionality
analyses.202
As mentioned, Hawai'i Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)
command in ordinary discovery a separate and early proportionality analysis.
While arguments for active deployment of proportionality analysis in all cases
falls beyond the scope of this article,20 3 what follows are suggestions for how
the cost-benefit proportionality principle might productively be employed
through tailoring Hawai'i Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) to e-discovery in Hawai'i courts.2°04
'9' HAw. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (roughly equivalent); see
Eric K. Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawaii Courts: The Evolving Role of the
Managerial Judge in Civil Litigation, 9 U. HAw. L. REV. 395, 443 (1987) (discussing use of
Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) "at the outset" of litigation).
198 See Yamamoto, supra note 197, at 443,445,448-51.
'99 Hw. R. Civ. P. 26(c); FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(c); see, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d
822, 827-28 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing a protective order analysis under Rule 26(c) as
requiring great specificity tailored to protect the specific information and source); In re Adobe
Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 141 F.R.D. 155, 158 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (discussing unfair competitive
advantage in a motion for a protective order).
200 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
201 See, e.g., Rivera, 384 F.3d. at 827-28.
202 See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (1 th Cir. 1987).
203 To the extent that Hawai'i courts tend to underuse this rule in ordinary discovery, we
suggest significantly ramped up usage for ordinary as well as e-discovery. Hawai'i appellate
courts' general guidance regarding Rule 26(b)(2) cost-benefit analysis is that trial courts have
discretion to "limit the amount of discovery on a case-by-case basis even in the absence of
sanctionable abuse." Acoba v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 92 Haw. 1, 11, 986 P.2d 288, 298 (1999).
204 See Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003)
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The one amended federal rule that expressly refers to proportionality in e-
discovery does not clearly apply to all e-discovery. This rule, amended Federal
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), incorporates a two-tiered system for ESI production. 20 5 The
rule provides that, in the first tier, a responding party must produce relevant and
reasonably accessible ESI but can withhold ESI deemed "not reasonably
accessible. 20 6 Then, if either a motion to compel or for a protective order is
filed, a responding party-in the second tier--"must show that the [ESI] is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. '207 Regardless of the
success of this showing, the court may order discovery if the requesting party
also shows "good cause," considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)'s
general cost-benefit proportionality principle.
0 8
The language of Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) thus indicates that e-discovery
proportionality considerations do not operate at the threshold of discovery but
only come into play when: (1) the responding party contends that particular
ESI is not reasonably accessible; (2) a "trigger motion" is filed (either by the
responding party for a protective order or by the requesting party to compel
production); (3) a showing of undue burden or cost is made by the responding
party; and (4) a counter showing of good cause is made by the requesting
party.20 9 But, contrary to the language of the rule, the Federal Advisory
("Rule 26(b)(2) balancing factors are all that is needed to allow a court to reach a fair result
when considering the scope of discovery of electronic records."); cf Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III) (articulating a seven-factor test
for cost-shifting).
205 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B):
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On
motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from
such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
206 id.
207 Id.
208 Id. The Proposed Uniform Rules specifically incorporate the last four factors of Federal
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)-the amount in controversy, the resources of the parties, the importance of the
issues, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues-but implicitly
limit any proportionality considerations to these four factors. See LOSEY, supra note 47,
at 110-11, cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
209 Id. In critique of the impact of the rules, one commentator suggests that amended Federal
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) rewards continued use of outdated computer systems by immunizing from
discovery data that is difficult to access under existing ESI systems. See LoSEY, supra note 47,
at 84-90. It seems unlikely, however, that companies would maintain outdated systems for this
reason. Doing so would constrict business activity and would also inhibit their ability to abide
by amended Federal Rules 16(b) and 26(0, which require parties to quickly identify and review
large amounts of electronic data and respond to discovery requests. See id. at 84-87 (citing
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Committee Notes to Rule 26(b)(2) maintain that proportionality criteria "apply
to all discovery of [ESI], including that stored on reasonably accessible
electronic sources.,
210
This ambiguity is slight but significant. It is unclear whether the
proportionality principle is also to guide parties in crafting e-discovery plans
and organizing the full range of parties' e-discovery practices or, similar to
Rule 26(c), whether it is to be applied only to disputed requests for particular
ESI that is deemed "not reasonably accessible."
Moreover, even if they desire to apply Rule 26(b)(2) broadly, attorneys and
judges might easily adopt a restricted approach to proportionality-i.e., for only
specific disputes rather than when parties create e-discovery plans and
determine e-discovery practices for the entire litigation. This approach would
be "easy" and "restricted" because it would mimic the limited protective order
approach to burdens and costs. But doing so would bypass the opportunity to
invoke the proportionality principle in shaping e-discovery throughout the
litigation.
To claify these ambiguities, we recommend that the proportionality principle
embodied in Hawai'i Rule 26(b)(2) and Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C) operate
throughout the litigation for all e-discovery-that is, when parties, attorneys or
judges are crafting overarching e-discovery plans as well as when specific
e-discovery cost-benefit disputes arise. It should also operate as an integral
part of the threshold determination whether ESI is "not reasonably accessible."
The utility and elegance of embracing cost-benefit proportionality
throughout the litigation for all e-discovery is underscored by a pre-existing
enforcement rule for "disproportionate discovery." Rule 26(g), the general
discovery sanctions rule, requires that the attorney sign discovery requests,
responses and objections, certifying among other things that the attorney's
conduct is consistent with the cost-benefit proportionality principle.21' Under
this general rule, Hawai'i courts are required to impose "an appropriate
sanction" against an attorney orparty or both for violations without substantial
justification of the proportionality principle.212 While Rule 26(g) was not
Garrie et al., Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending the Federal Rules to Accommodate
Electronic Discovery, 25 REv. LmG. 115 (2006)). Many commentators observe that the "good
cause" requirement would likely discourage fraudulent practice. See id.
210 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006).
211 HAW. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1):
[T]hat to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a
reasonable inquiry, the request, response, or objection is... not unreasonable or unduly
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the
case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation.
(emphasis added); accord FED. R. Ciw. P. 26(g)(1).
212 HAw. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(2) (emphasis added); accord FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3).
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crafted with e-discovery in mind, its purpose of deterring wasteful discovery
filings applies to e-discovery as well.
2. Cost-shifting
Another gap in the federal e-discovery rules regime that is related to the
proportionality principle, is whether and when to shift costs of preserving and
producing ESI. Traditionally, discovery burdens and costs have fallen largely
on responding parties.2 13 They are now being shifted with increasing regularity
to requesting parties.214 Without carefully assessed cost-shifting, the high costs
of e-discovery can exacerbate the distorting effect of unequal resources among
parties and affect strategic litigation decisions independent of the merits.
215
The most often-cited considerations for determining when courts are to order
(or approve) e-discovery cost-shifting are articulated in Zubulake 111.216
Zubulake III first determined that cost-shifting should only be considered when
"inaccessible data" is sought and then described seven cost-shifting factors.217
The main factors are relatively straightforward: the extent that the request is
specifically tailored; the availability of the requested information from other
sources; the total cost of production compared to the amount in controversy;
and the respondent's available resources. 21 8 The remaining factors involve
more subjective valuing of "the relative ability of each party to control costs
and its incentives to do so[,] ... the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation ... and the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.,
219
Zubulake III designed its cost-shifting calculus "to simplify application of the
Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality test in the context of electronic data and to
reinforce the traditional presumptive allocation of costs," but only for "not
reasonably accessible" ESI. 220  As discussed, Rule 26(b)(2) cost-benefit
213 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,358 (1978) ("[T]he presumption
is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests....").
214 See generally Ross Chaffin, Comment, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the
Rising Cost and lmportance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REv. 115 (2006).
215 See, e.g., Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 65, at 369 ("Judges are left to determine cost-
shifting motions on a fact-intensive basis by drawing on the often-ignored 'proportionality'
provisions of Rule 26(b)(2).").
216 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake 11).
217 Id. (emphasis omitted).
218 Id. (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(Zubulake 1)).
219 Id. (citing Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324).
220 Id.; see id. at 289 ("Factors one through four tip against cost-shifting (although factor two
only slightly so). Factors five and six are neutral, and factor seven favors cost-shifting."); see
also id (stating that determining how much of costs should be shifted is "a matter ofjudgment
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proportionality analysis encompasses "the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues."221 Similar to Zubulake III, the Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 26(b)(2), in discussing a court's authority to shift costs, only refers to
ESI that is "not reasonably accessible. 222
Restricting cost-shifting to ESI deemed "not reasonably accessible,"
however, overestimates the similarity between e-discovery and ordinary
discovery.223 E-discovery often costs far more than traditional discovery even if
the ESI is reasonably accessible. 2 4
This substantial gap in e-discovery rules-that is, the omission of
"reasonably accessible ESI" cost-shifting-needs careful filling.225 The ESI
reality justifies Hawai'i courts' serious consideration of case-by-case cost-
shifting-under the Zubulake III factors-for both "reasonably accessible" and
"not reasonably accessible," relevant and non-privileged ESI.
C. Duty to Preserve ESI and Sanctions for Destruction
The Hawai'i courts will likely face ESI preservation and destruction issues
but with only limited guidance from the amended Federal Rules. In this section
we address gaps in the e-discovery rules regime concerning two critical related
issues: the duty to preserve ESI and possible sanctions for its destruction.
1. Attorneys' and clients' duty to preserve ESI
E-discovery on Hawai'i courts' horizon will certainly encompass motions to
sanction a party and her attorney for breach of a "duty to preserve" ESI before
litigation commenced. But the amended Federal Rules are silent on this
and fairness" informed by the seven-factor test); id. at 290 (stating that "where cost-shifting is
appropriate, only the costs .... of making inaccessible material accessible" should be shifted).
121 HAw. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii); accord FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
222 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note (2006).
223 See Qualters, States Launching E-Discovery Rules, supra note 38 (stating that judges
"wouldn't order you to produce a million pages of documents from a warehouse [but] in the
electronic era they do [from computer systems]") (alterations in original).
224 See, e.g., Mazza et al., supra note 6, at 38 n.93 (articulating the high cost of preserving
data, even for a single case); Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal But Could
BeBetter: The Economics ofImproving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889,
894 (2009) (stating that the the cost of e-discovery is high because of both volume and
inaccessibility).
225 See Jessica Lynn Repa, Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business:
Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic
Discovery, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 257 (2004).
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threshold question of a party's and attorney's duty to preserve ESI. When and
under what circumstances does the duty arise? Who is responsible for
implementing ESI preservation policies in practice? What level of culpability
is required to breach the duty to preserve-subjective bad faith, recklessness,
negligence or mere inadvertence? And what range of sanctions is authorized
and appropriate for breaches of the duty?
The Federal Rules regime provides little or no guidance on these key
questions. In this subsection we address the first two questions concerning the
duty to preserve; in the next we address the latter two questions about sanctions
for breach of that duty.
The amended Federal Rules are silent on parties' and attorneys' affirmative
duty to preserve ESI. 226 New Federal Rule 37(e), discussed in Section II.C.5,
partially addresses preservation and destruction of ESI by providing a safe
harbor from sanctions for "loss" of ESI due to "routine, good-faith
operation., 227 By shielding parties and attorneys from sanctions for destruction
of ESI under limited circumstances the rule implies that there exists an
underlying duty to preserve ESI.228 But the rule does not address when or how
that duty arises.
As an integral part of its new rules regime for e-discovery, the Hawai'i courts
will therefore need to shape the duty to preserve ESI and to provide clear notice
of the foundation for potential sanctions for missteps. In particular, the courts
will need to bring clarity to the ambiguous obligation recognized in the
Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule 26(f)-that attorneys and parties
"discuss" preservation and "balance" preservation with businesses' continued
operation.229
226 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 132, at 85 (stating that "[t]he rule itself does not
purport to create or affect... preservation obligations").
The federal e-discovery rules regime does not address preservation directly, although the
Advisory Committee Notes to amended Federal Rule 26(f) suggest attorneys' early discussion
about ESI preservation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006). When
determining the scope of ESI preservation, the Notes to Federal Rule 26(0 direct attorneys and
businesses to "pay particular attention to the balance between the competing needs to preserve
relevant evidence and to continue routine operations critical to ongoing activities." FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006) (recognizing that "[c]omplete or broad cessation of a
party's routine computer operations could paralyze the party's activities." (citing MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LmGATION (FoURTH) § 11.422 (2004))).
227 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost
as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system." (emphasis
added)).
228 Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006) ("A preservation obligation
may arise from many sources, including common law, statutes, and regulations.").
229 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
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Evolving federal procedural common law has loosely filled this gap by
combining rules to create a preservation duty for attorneys and parties, called
the Zubulake duty.230 Briefly stated, Zubulake imposes a duty to institute a
"litigation hold" on the destruction of ESI "[o]nce [the party] reasonably
anticipates litigation. ' 23' This rather simple formulation of the duty to preserve
belies its complexity. The "reasonably anticipates litigation" language means
that the duty to preserve ESI often arises well before litigation commences.
More fully conceived, the duty also imposes upon a litigant a "duty to preserve
what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is
reasonably likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a
pending discovery request.,
232
No single rule imposes the Zubulake duty. It is an amalgam that draws upon
existing general discovery rules, procedural common law and the unique
realities of ESI storage, retrieval and destruction. 33 One public critic of the
Zubulake duty nevertheless acknowledges the importance of rule guidance for
the duty to preserve.234
230 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V).
231 Id. at 431 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212,218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(Zubulake IV)). This standard for timing makes sense because it is consistent with the Federal
Rule 26(b)(3) (and Hawai'i Rule 26(b)(4)) timing for immunity for attorney work-product that
is prepared in anticipation of litigation. Courts may turn to this body of case law for
interpretation of "reasonably anticipates litigation."
232 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142
F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
233 See generally Sc"WnEiNu ET AL., supra note 6, at 90-96 (discussing the breadth of and
nuanced legal issues of the Zubulake duty, some of which are a direct result of the nature of
ESI).
234 One prominent public critic of the Zubulake duty argues that the Zubulake duty is
"draconian," expensive, without legal basis, bad public policy because it shifts responsibilities
from parties to their attorneys and will lead to unnecessary satellite litigation. David Levitt,
Counsel's ObligationsforE-Discovery, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 2007, at 44. Levitt argues that
the Federal Rules have traditionally emphasized parties' near sole responsibility for discovery.
Id. at 45. He also observes that the obligation to supplement responses under the Zubulake duty
is broader than Rule 26(e) suggests because Zubulake imposes an affirmative duty to ensure
that discovery responses are not erroneous-while the Rule, he argues, merely requires that
attorneys or parties update or reveal errors if they learn that updates or errors exist. Id. at 45-46.
Finally, Levitt argues that the Zubulake duty and the amended e-discovery rules will increase
expenses and the satellite litigation of discovery disputes, rather than lessen expenses as
designed. Id. at 46-47. Levitt acknowledges nevertheless that an attorney's greater familiarity
with a client's computer systems early in cases "may be a wise idea" so that the attorney can
explain to opposing counsel and the court what her client has, what steps the client has taken to
preserve ESI and how the client will proceed. Id. at 46-47.
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The Zubulake duty covers an attorney's duty to "coordinat[e] her client's
discovery efforts, 2 35 in part by "oversee[ing] compliance with the litigation
hold., 236 Policed by sanctions, the duty particularly requires attorneys to
237
oversee clients' ESI preservation. As officers of the court and agents for
their clients, attorneys are deemed at least partially responsible for their clients'
e-discovery preservation and destruction mistakes.238 Zubulake therefore
observes that attorneys need to understand the significance of e-discovery
disclosures and become "more conscious of the contours of the preservation
obligation." 239 Zubulake also instructs attorneys to "becomefully familiar with
[their] client's document retention policies, as well as the client's data retention
architecture... [which will] invariably involve speaking with information
technology personnel ... and communicating with the 'key players' in the
litigation. 24 °
The Zubulake duty also elongates the duty to preserve ESI through the
obligation to supplement discovery responses. 24' In conjunction with Rule
26(e), which governs supplemental responses, the Zubulake preservation duty
encompasses all relevant ESI "in existence at the time the duty to preserve
attaches[] and any relevant documents created thereafter., 242  Attorneys
235 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 435.
236 Id. at 432. As this article was going to press Judge Scheindlin issued an opinion she
titled "Zubulake Revisited: Six Years Later." Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension
Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2010 WL 184312 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
2010). Among other things, the opinion clarifies that the party's and attorney's duty to preserve
encompasses clear instructions to preserve specified ESI, the actual preservation of that ESI and
the collection of the preserved ESI. Id. at _, 2010 WL 184312, at *8 (citing SCHEINDLIN ET
AL., supra note 6, at 147-49).
237 See id.
238 E.g., Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D. 591,616 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 3, 2009); United States v. Krause (In re Krause), 367 B.R. 740 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007);
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432-33; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (Zubulake IV); Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees
Int'l Union, 212 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal
Rules, supra note 122, at 324-26; see also Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the
Discovery of ESI Since December 1, 2006, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 6 n. 14 (2008) (discussing
federal court decisions regarding varying standards for imposing sanctions for spoliation of
discoverable material).
239 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 433 (citing Telecom Int'l Am. Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 189
F.R.D. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
240 Id. at 432 (emphasis added) (citing Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218). The Zubulake court
encouraged attorneys to "be creative" if speaking with every key player is not feasible because
of the scope of the case or size of the company client. Id,
241 Id. at 432-33; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e); HAw. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
242 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218; Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432-33 ("Although the
Rule 26 duty to supplement is nominally the party's, it really falls on counsel."); see FED. R.
CIv. P. 26(e) advisory committee's note (1970) ("Although the party signs the answers, it is his
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therefore must "oversee compliance. .. [and continue to] monitor[] the party's
efforts to retain and produce the relevant documents" even if the ESI is
generated after initial disclosures or its existence and location only later become
known.
2 4 3
In Zubulake itself, Laura Zubulake filed an EEOC gender discrimination
claim in August 2001 .244 UBS' in-house counsel instructed employees to
preserve relevant documents in that month.245 Employees at UBS began
deleting or not saving relevant ESI in September 2001.24 In October of that
year Zubulake was fired by her employer, UBS.247 She brought a Title VII
discrimination suit in February 2002.248 UBS's in-house counsel reiterated the
preservation instruction in February 2002 and September 2002, and outside
counsel gave similar instructions in August 2002.249 The court determined that
UBS's duty to preserve the ESI began in April 2001-well before suit was
filed, before Zubulake was fired, before she filed an EEOC discrimination
complaint, and most important, before the key ESI was destroyed.25°
Two facts undergirded the court's determination. First, Zubulake's
supervisor conceded in a deposition that he feared litigation as early as April
2001.251 Second, emails from several key colleagues dating back to April 2001
referred to Zubulake and were designated "UBS Attorney Client Privilege.
252
Therefore, the court determined that the duty to preserve the ESI arose when
UBS' officials "reasonably anticipated" a legal claim and litigation-April
2001-almost one year before litigation commenced. At the latest, the duty to
lawyer who understands their significance and bears the responsibility to bring answers up to
date.... In practice, therefore, the lawyer under a continuing burden must periodically recheck
all interrogatories and canvass all new information.").
243 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432.
244 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309,312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake 1).
245 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 215-16; Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 425.
246 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake II1).
247 Zubulakel, 217 F.R.D. at 312.
248 Id.
249 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 215-16; Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 425.
250 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216-17.
251 Id. at 217.
252 Id. Interestingly, these emails were deleted from UBS' system and recovered from UBS'
backup tapes. In an earlier motion, the court ordered that costs for UBS to restore backup tapes
should be shared. Therefore, if Zubulake had not continued to pursue discovery of emails
containing relevant information-even if it meant sharing the high costs for restoring UBS'
backup tapes-it is unlikely that these relevant non-privileged emails would have been
discovered. Although UBS' in-house and outside counsel repeatedly advised institution of a
litigation hold, UBS' implementation did not prevent the overwriting of stored emails prior to or
after the date that the hold was "triggered." IfUBS' litigation hold on the deletion of relevant
emails had been effective, the expense of restoring back-up tapes likely could have been
avoided.
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preserve arose in August 2001, when UBS' in-house counsel first informally
instructed that employees implement a litigation hold-still the month before
UBS began to destroy or not save relevant ESI.
We suggest that Hawai'i courts carefully assess the many aspects of the
Zubulake preservation duty and seriously consider incorporating that duty into
Hawai'i e-discovery practice. Since the Zubulake duty is extensive and spans
across all cases, however, it might sometimes impose onerous preservation
obligations beyond what is proportional to the parties resources, the importance
of the issues, and the significance of the ESI. It might also unduly burden the
daily operations of small and big litigants and governments. To address these
problems, the court should employ a proportionality analysis in assessing the
extent of a party's preservation duty. Thus, where the costs of preserving
relevant ESI threaten to overtake possible litigation benefits, the proportionality
principle discussed earlier offers apt guidance. Fully shaping the contours of
the duty to preserve to fit Hawai'i practice needs will likely entail thoughtful
pronouncements through future cases.
2. Sanctions for destruction of ESI
Parties and attorneys breach their duty to preserve ESI through destruction of
ESI subject to a litigation hold. In some instances, as in Zubulake, a litigation
hold will be required well before the filing of a lawsuit and may be triggered by
a key player's or a business' "reasonable anticipation" that a suit will arise. In
other cases, a litigation hold may be triggered by the filing of a lawsuit itself.
When parties and their attorneys breach the duty to preserve ESI the prospect of
sanctions arises.
a. Broader context: Hawai'i court sanctions for non-e-discovery abuse
Hawai'i courts are familiar with the destruction of discoverable
information-from mistakes in smaller cases to gross abuses in complex
ones.253 To broaden the context for handling sanction motions for ESI
destruction we first highlight the Hawai'i Supreme Court's treatment of the
destruction of potential evidence across a spectrum of "ordinary" discovery
disputes.
Wong v. City & County of Honolulu started as a simple car accident suit that
morphed into a major dispute about the City's destruction of discoverable
253 E.g., Cho v. State ofHawai'i, 115 Haw. 373, 168 P.3d 17 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
1185 (2008); Kawamnata Farms, Inc., v. United Agric. Prods., 86 Haw. 214, 948 P.2d 1055
(1997); Wong v. City & County of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 389, 665 P.2d 157 (1983).
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"tangible things." 254 Following multiple informal and formal requests for
production of a traffic signal box for testing, a private contractor removed and
destroyed the box while under the supervision of City employees. 255 The box
was essential to the plaintiffs claim that the City failed to properly maintain
it.256 By affirming the court's sanction against the City, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court confirmed that the City had a duty to place a "litigation hold" on the box
at least upon receiving a formal request for production, if not sooner.257
The Circuit Court imposed sanctions against the City under Hawaii Rule
37(d) for its failure to respond to the discovery request.258 The court estopped
the City from claiming that the signal box was not defective or that any
malfunction was caused by the manufacturer. 259 The court did not, however,
employ the common law doctrine of sanctions for spoliation (destruction) of
discoverable material. Instead it relied exclusively upon Rule 37(d) to preclude
the City from supporting those defenses through a cross-reference to Rule
37(b)(2)(B)--Rule 37(d) for the authority to sanction and Rule 37(b)(2)(B) for
the type of sanction.
260
Cho v. State is a moderately complex toxic tort case marked by a deliberate
destruction of discoverable building debris that it could have "restored," but,
understandably, did not.2 6' The school custodian, Cho, sued the State for
injuries caused by exposure to lead, mercury and arsenic through his ten-year
occupancy of a government-leased cottage.26 The State sent debris from the
demolished cottage--crucial to the Chos' claim-to a mainland refuse site.263
The State violated a court production order because it would cost one million
dollars to re-locate and produce the debris. 264 For violating its production
254 See Wong, 66 Haw. at 391, 665 P.2d at 159.
255 Id.
256 See id.
257 See id. at 394, 665 P.2d at 161.
258 See id. at 391-93, 665 P.2d at 160-61.
219 Id. at 391, 665 P.2d at 160 (quoting unpublished Circuit Court Order by Judge Arthur
S.K. Fong, Oct. 3, 1978).
260 Wong, 66 Haw. at 392-93, 665 P.2d at 160-61.
If a party... fails.., to serve a written response to a request for inspection ... the court
on motion ... may ... make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of this
subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
(citing HAw. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (emphasis omitted)).
261 115 Haw. 373, 168 P.3d 17 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1185 (2008).
262 Id. at 375, 168 P.3d at 19.
263 id.
264 Id. at 377-78, 168 P.3d at 21-22. The Circuit Court noted that the State decided not to
produce the debris, at least in part, because the estimated cost to retrieve and produce it was
somewhere between $150,000 and $1 million. Id. at 378, 384, 168 P.3d at 22, 28. Upon the
Circuit Court's reconsideration of the sanctions order, the State pointed out that in addition to
University of Hawai "i Law Review / Vol. 32:153
order, the court sanctioned the State under Hawai'i Rule 37(b)(2)(B),
precluding it from contesting the presence of toxins in the soil.265 As in Wong,
the court did not employ the common law doctrine of spoliation as the basis for
sanctions and instead relied on Hawai'i Rule 37(b). The Hawai'i Supreme
Court affirmed. 66
Complex cases in Hawai'i sometimes involve severe discovery abuse. The
string of cases involving the DuPont chemical company is an iconic example of
how discovery abuse in Hawai'i is often linked to cases elsewhere.267
Kawamata Farms, a Hawai'i farm corporation, brought a products liability suit
against DuPont. 268 DuPont intentionally withheld numerous crucial technical
documents-some of which were later found to have been disclosed in a
parallel suit against DuPont in Florida.269
Throughout thirty months of discovery the Hawai'i Circuit Court issued
twenty-six orders compelling discovery and twenty-seven orders imposing
sanctions against DuPont.270  Judge Ronald Ibarra found that DuPont's
concealment of documents containing relevant technical information was part
of a "pattern of discovery abuse" and sanctioned DuPont under Hawai'i
Rule 37(b)(2) and its inherent power for DuPont's failure to produce relevant
information.27' Judge Ibarra ordered admission of critically damaging
evidence, use of adverse jury instructions, the lifting of protective orders and
payment of attorneys' fees and costs. 272 Judge Ibarra also ordered $1.5 million
273in a criminal contempt sanction against DuPont.
the $1 million cost to produce-which the trial judge did not know of-the Attorney General
was unable to comply because the entire State budget for litigation expenses for that fiscal year
was approximately $1.4 million, and the value of the Chos' case was less than $1 million. Id.
265 Id. at 379, 168 P.3d at 23 (applying HAw. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B)). Rule 37(b)(2)(B)
permits a court, "as [is] just," to refuse a party to support or oppose claims or defenses as a
sanction for that party's failure to obey a court order to provide or permit discovery. HAw. R.
Crv. P. 37(b)(2)(B). Here, the court precluded the State's defense that toxins were not present
because the State deliberately did not produce the debris in direct violation of a court order.
266 Cho, 115 Haw. at 386, 168 P.3d at 30.
267 Kawamata Farms v. United Agric. Prods., 86 Haw. 214, 948 P.2d 1055 (1997). See
Matsuura v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 102 Haw. 149, 150-52, 73 P.3d 687, 688-90
(2003), for a brief discussion of DuPont's Benlate litigation.
268 Kawamala Farms, 86 Haw. at 222, 948 P.2d at 1063.
269 Id at 228,948 P.2d at 1069 (without citation to Smith v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
727 So. 2d 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
270 Id. at 224, 948 P.2d at 1065.
271 Id.; see also Matsuura, 102 Haw. at 150-52, 73 P.3d at 688-90 (discussing the
procedural history of Benlate litigation in Hawai'i).
272 Kawamata Farms, 86 Haw. at 224-27, 948 P.3d at 1065-68; see Matsuura, 102 Haw.
at 150-52, 73 P.3d at 688-90.
273 Kawamata Farms, 86 Haw. at 225,948 P.3d at 1066. DuPont waived appellate review
of sanctions for criminal contempt by not raising objections to the Circuit Court. Kawamata
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.Wong, Cho and DuPont reveal that destruction or concealment of litigation
information-whether inadvertent or purposeful-poses a discovery challenge
for Hawai'i courts. With the continuing expansion of ESI, e-discovery sanction
issues will also likely surface across the entire spectrum of cases-from small
to large, the collegial to the conflicted.
b. General discovery sanction rules applicable to ESI destruction
For many e-discovery disputes, the general discovery sanctions rule, Rule
26(g), will govern.274 When litigation commences and attorneys (or parties)
sign discovery "requests, responses or objections, '275 Rule 26(g) imposes a set
of obligations as the foundation for potential sanctions.276 First, the signer must
conduct "reasonable inquiry" under the circumstances.2 77 Second, sanctions are
mandated if the discovery filing is for an "improper purpose" (including
harassment, delay or increasing costs), not reasonably grounded in law and
facts, or violates the proportionality principle (discussed in Section IV.B). z78
Patterned after Rule 11,279 Rule 26(g) is intended "to deter those who might be
tempted to [engage in discovery mis]conduct in the absence of such a
deterrent.,
280
Rule 26(g) seeks to eliminate "kneejerk discovery requests served without
consideration of cost or burden to the responding party" and the "equally
abusive practice of objecting to discovery requests reflexively-but not
reflectively-and without a factual basis. 281 Careless requests and boilerplate
objections are even more disruptive in the realm of e-discovery where
Farms, 86 Haw. at 248-49, 948 P.2d at 1089-90. While not explicitly stated in the Hawai'i
Supreme Court opinion, Judge Ibarra possessed authority to impose these sanctions under
Hawai'i Rules 26(g) (discovery sanctions rule analogous to Rule 11), 37(b)(2) and 60(b)(3).
274 See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251,265 (D. Md. 2008).
275 Rule 26(g) authorizes "judges [to] impose appropriate sanctions [for groundless or
unduly burdensome filings] and requires them to use it." FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee's note (1983) (emphasis added); id. ("[The amendment] ... is designed to curb
discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of sanctions."; "Concern about
discovery abuse has led to widespread recognition that there is a need for more aggressive
judicial control and supervision."); see also HAW. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
276 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g); accord HAw. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
277 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g); accord RAW. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g); accord RAW. R. CIv. P. 26(g).
279 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note (1983).
280 Nat'l Hockey League (NHL) v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per
curiam). NHL has since stood for commitment to the goal of deterring discovery abuse by
mandating judicial imposition of sanctions. See Barbara J. Gorham, Note and Comment,
Fisions: Will it Tame the Beast of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REv. 765, 775 (1994).
281 Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008).
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disproportionately expansive requests can overwhelm attorneys and clients and
reflexive objections can foreclose access to significant ESI. 282
Rule 26(g), however, does not govern e-discovery duties to preserve ESI that
are breached before litigation begins or that do not entail signed filings.283
Similarly, other general discovery sanction rules are activated by conduct
during, not before, the litigation. For instance, Rule 37(b)(2) provides
sanctions generally for failure to comply with a court order compelling
discovery.284 Rule 37(c) permits sanctions for failure to provide mandatory
disclosures under Rule 26(a) or supplement those mandatory disclosures and
testifying expert opinions under Rule 26(e). 285 Rule 37(d) provides sanctions
for complete failure to respond to a request for interrogatories or inspection or
appear at a deposition, including a request for electronic materials.286 The
problem with attempting to apply these general rules to ESI preservation and
destruction issues is that they are not tailored to the pre-litigation duty to
preserve ESI.
Courts may invoke their inherent power to impose attorneys' fees or case
dispositive sanctions if discovery misconduct amounts to bad faith.287 Proof of
bad faith, however, is difficult to muster, and thus courts rarely invoke their
inherent power for those sanctions. A common law tort claim for intentional or
negligent spoliation of evidence is recognized by several jurisdictions, but not
by Hawai'i courts.
288
Therefore the general Hawai'i sanctions rules and the Hawai'i courts'
inherent power to control litigation289 appear to be largely inadequate for e-
282 See id.
283 See Grimm et al., supra note 73, at 397-99 (discussing limitations that the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), places on civil rules).
2m FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); HAw. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); see also Child Support Enforcement
Agency v. Roe, 96 Haw. 1, 15,25 P.3d 60, 74 (2001) (expanding the reach of Rule 37(b)(2) to
authorize sanctions "when a court unequivocally and prospectively notifies a party of a
discovery requirement that the court expects that party to obey") (quoting Fujimoto v. Au, 95
Haw. 116, 166, 19 P.3d 699, 749 (2001)).
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c); HAW. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
286 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d); HAw. R. Cv. P. 37(d).
287 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-50 (1991) (stating that a court's inherent
power to render an attorneys' fees sanction depends upon a finding of bad faith).
288 Matsuura v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 102 Haw. 149, 166-68, 73 P.3d 687,
704-06 (2003). While a tort claim for spoliation of evidence is not yet recognized in Hawai'i,
this is likely to be a fertile area for future litigation when parties realize that ESI was destroyed
in an earlier case. Where it is recognized, courts require: "(1) the destruction of evidence;
(2) the disruption or significant impairment of the lawsuit; and (3) a causal relationship between
the destruction of evidence and the inability to prove the lawsuit." Id. (citations omitted).
289 The Hawai'i Supreme Court has recognized generally that "courts have the inherent
equity, supervisory, and administrative powers as well as inherent power to control the litigation
process before them.... [including] the powers to create a remedy for a wrong even in the
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discovery. They provide only indirect guidance and do not establish a clear
deterrent against improper ESI destruction or a strong incentive for proper ESI
preservation. Even if the Hawai'i judiciary adopts the federal e-discovery rules
regime, it will need to provide that guidance, particularly by defining,
explaining and enforcing the "duty to preserve" ESI. As discussed, Hawai'i
courts might look most productively to the Zubulake opinions for that guidance.
c. A limited safe harbor for "loss" of ESI
As mentioned,29 ° the only rule that specifically addresses ESI "loss," Federal
Rule 37(e), actually prohibits sanctions.29'
More specifically, Federal Rule 37(e) partially addresses ESI destruction by
providing a safe harbor from sanctions for "loss" of ESI due to "routine, good-
faith operation" of an ESI "overwriting" or destruction policy.292 By shielding
parties and attorneys from sanctions for ESI destruction under limited
circumstances the rule implies that there exists an underlying duty to preserve
absence of specific statutory remedies, and to prevent unfair results." Kawamata Farms v.
United Agric. Prods., 86 Haw. at 242, 948 P.2d at 1083 (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko
(Waikiki Corp.), 76 Haw. 494, 507, 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994)). In addition, the court has
identified factors for determining whether discovery sanctions are generally appropriate:
(1) the offending party's culpability, if any, in destroying or withholding discoverable
evidence that the opposing party had formally requested through discovery; (2) whether
the opposing party suffered any resulting prejudice as a result of the offending party's
destroying or withholding the discoverable evidence; and (3) the inequity that would
occur in allowing the offending party to accrue a benefit from its conduct.
Id. at 244, 948 P.2d at 1084 (citing Richardson, 76 Haw. at 507, 880 P.2d at 182).
290 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
291 FED. R. CIrv. P. 37(e).
292 Id. ("Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these
rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system." (emphasis added)).
Businesses lobbied hard for this new rule. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana
Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the Twenty-First Century, 11 MiCH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REv. 71, 72 (2004). It provides a partial shield from sanctions for businesses for
destroying ESI through routine processes before their duty to preserve ESI kicks in. Id. at 72-
73; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (citing
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and Federal
Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CoRp. & FIN. L. 721 (2003)). Healthy
disagreement remains over whether this shield is too large or too small and how it operates in
practice. Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 81, at 368-69. Businesses want to "forbid
sanctions in the absence of willful or reckless conduct." Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note
292, at 72. Others argue that a bad faith standard is unworkable and allows for wholesale
destruction of ESI. Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 292, at 72.
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ESI.293 But the rule does not affirmatively authorize sanctions for breach of
that duty or guide the courts in imposing appropriate sanctions.
Under Rule 37(e) the meanings of "routine" and "good-faith" are critical.
According to the Advisory Committee, "routine" operation refers to "ways in
which such systems are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to
meet the party's technical and business needs," including document retention
policies and "alteration and overwriting" of ESI that often occurs without users'
specific awareness. 94 If routine operation results in loss of ESI, courts must
determine if destruction occurred in "good-faith." 295 Good-faith "d6pends on
the circumstances of each case" and may turn upon "whether the party
reasonably believes [at the time of destruction] that the information on such
sources is likely to be discoverable."296 The Advisory Committee observed that
routine operations should not "thwart discovery obligations by allowing that
operation to... destroy... [ESI] that it is required to preserve. '
297
The Committee, however, stopped short of declaring that a party fails the
Rule 37(e) "good-faith" test if it allows routine destruction in breach of its duty
to preserve.specific ESI. Judge Shira Scheindlin, the author of the Zubulake
opinions, and other scholars have noted Rule 37(e)'s ambiguities. 29' The
"sparse language raises serious questions about its reach and scope," and it
"affords no certain protection against sanctions. 299
By piecing together its several statements, it appears that the Advisory
Committee contemplated that even "routine" destruction of ESI subject to a
tacitly recognized duty to preserve would constitute a breach of that duty and
that this "loss" of the ESI would not be in "good-faith." The safe harbor
protection from sanctions, therefore, would not apply.3 0° Assuming that this is
293 Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006) ("A preservation obligation
may arise from many sources, including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in
the case.").
294 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
295 Id.
296 Id; see, e.g., U & I Corp. v. Advanced Med. Design, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 667 (M.D. Fla.
2008) (imposing sanctions for improperly destroying ESI); Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. College, 248
F.R.D. 372, 379 (D. Conn. 2007) (holding that the failure to properly institute a litigation hold
was "at least grossly negligent, if not reckless").
297 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
298 SCHEINDLIN ET A.., supra note 6, at 403 (emphasis added).
299 Id (emphasis added).
300 Judge Shira Scheindlin, author of the landmark Zubulake opinions, and other well-known
commentators of e-discovey law, observed, "[tlhe one common thread is that... Rule [3 7(e)
does not excuse a party from rule-based sanctions for a failure to comply with a preservation
obligation." Id.; see also Oklahoma ex rel. Edmonson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 1498973
(N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007).
The Court notes that although no formal preservation order has been entered herein, the
obligation of the parties to preserve evidence, including ESI, arises as soon as a party is
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what the rulemakers contemplated, it is not reflected in the language of the rule
itself. Most important, this construction of the rule only removes the safe
harbor from sanctions under these circumstances. It does not indicate which
affirmative rules authorize the imposition of sanctions or appropriate standards
for doing so.
This gap is illuminated by the analogous situation of a government's safe
harbor from suit (sovereign immunity) and the plaintiffs underlying
substantive legal claim. In a suit against the federal or state government a
plaintiff must first overcome the government's immunity.301  If sovereign
immunity is overcome by a showing of consent or waiver, then the plaintiff
must show that there are substantive law rules that establish the government's
liability (for example, negligent breach of duty).302 The removal of the safe
harbor (immunity) itself does not establish liability.
Similarly, a party seeking to sanction an opposing party or counsel for ESI
destruction must overcome two hurdles. First, the party must show that ESI
was destroyed by other than a "good-faith, routine" operation of an ESI
management policy.30 3 This removes the safe harbor protection. But it does
not automatically lead to sanctions. Second, the party must then proceed to the
substantive "liability" determination of whether rules or common law
affirmatively authorize sanctions under the specific circumstances. 3°
As an integral part of its new rules regime for e-discovery, the Hawai'i courts
will therefore need to expressly determine at the threshold whether "routine"
aware the documentation may be relevant. The Court further advises the parties that they
should be very cautious in relying upon any "safe harbor" doctrine as described in new
Rule 37[e].
SCHtEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 403 (quoting Edmonson, 2007 WL 1498973, at *6
(alteration in original)).
Judge Scheindlin and commentators also note other limits: (1) the Rule "explicitly
excludes [a safe harbor for] the non-party served with a subpoena duces tecum for ESI under
Rule 45;" and (2) "A judge always has inherent authority or contempt powers [to sanction
regardless of Rule authority]." SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 403 (citing Leon v. IDX
Sys., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006)).
301 See Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 607-08 (1992) (discussing Eleventh
Amendment immunity) (quoting W.I-. Greenwell, Ltd. v. Dept. of Land & Nat'l Res., 50 Haw.
207, 208-09, 436 P.2d 527, 528 (1968)).
302 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 120 Haw. 181, 229, 202 P.3d 1226, 1274
(2009) ("When the [S]tate has consented to be sued, its liability is to be judged under the same
principles as those governing the liability of private parties.") (quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel
Eng'g & Erection, Inc., 87 Haw. 37, 56, 951 P.2d 487, 506 (1998)).
303 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
304 But see Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1188 (D.
Utah 2009) (determining whether ESI was destroyed and if it were destroyed in a breach of the
duty to preserve; then determining what sanctions are appropriate in light of the Rule 37(e) safe
harbor).
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destruction of ESI subject to a litigation hold constitutes "loss" not in "good-
faith"--thereby removing the Rule 37(e) protection from sanctions. 305 We
suggest that it does and that this construction of Rule 37(e)'s safe harbor
provision is what the federal rulemakers intended.
The federal district court decision in Doe v. Norwalk Community College is
illustrative. There the court sanctioned an institutional defendant despite its
attempted reliance on the Federal Rule 37(e) safe harbor.30 6 The defendant,
Norwalk Community College, failed to impose a litigation hold or to follow a
formal ESI management policy.30 7 The plaintiff moved for sanctions because
Norwalk "completely wiped [out]" data on key witnesses' computers and email
metadata revealed ESI alteration and destruction. 30 8  Further, Norwalk
destroyed data earlier than designated by its regular document retention
policy.3
09
In its discussion of Rule 37(e),3 1° the court quoted the Advisory Committee
and determined that to take advantage of the safe harbor "a party needs to act
affirmatively to prevent the system from destroying or altering the information,
even if such conduct would occur in the regular course of business.,,31' The
court then held that because Norwalk failed to impose a litigation hold on the
ESI in light of "pending or reasonably anticipated litigation," the destruction
was not in good-faith and the safe harbor rule, thus, failed to shield Norwalk
from sanctions.
312
One clear lesson of Norwalk is that businesses' creation and implementation
of reasonable routine ESI retention and destruction policies--even before
litigation-is a necessary beginning (but only beginning) of the early attention
approach to e-discovery. Once a litigation hold is triggered, routine
"overwriting" of relevant ESI likely will not allow for the safe harbor
protections of Rule 37(e).
305 FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006) ("A
preservation obligation may arise from many sources, including common law, statutes, and
regulations.").
306 248 F.R.D. 372 (D. Conn. 2007).
307 id.
308 Id. at 376.
309 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
310 See supra note 112 (stating that the pertinent rule was moved to Rule 37(e) as a result of
stylistic amendments in 2007).
3 1 Doe, 248 F.R.D. at 378.
312 Id. Further, the court determined that Rule 37(e) requires "a routine system in order to
take advantage of the good-faith exception" and that Norwalk's lack of "one consistent,
'routine' system" nullified safe harbor protection. Id.
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d. Crafting an affirmative sanction rule for ESI destruction
A final related gap in the federal e-discovery rules regime is the absence of
an affirmative sanctions rule for destruction of relevant ESI-or put another
way, a rule authorizing sanctions for an attorney's or client's breach of the duty
to preserve ESI. As discussed, the safe harbor immunity of Rule 37(e) would
not apply under those circumstances, and judges would then look for
affirmative sanctioning authority. The Zubulake opinions, again, provide apt
guidance for the Hawai'i courts.
i. When are sanctions authorized?
Determining whether sanctions are authorized for destruction of ESI is a
two-step inquiry. First, was there a failure to effectively implement (and
continue) a litigation hold and therefore a breach of the duty to preserve? In
Zubulake, the court acknowledged in-house and outside counsels' multiple
attempts to enforce UBS' litigation hold, but still noted that both counsel and
party were to blame for the destruction of ESI and that many emails "were lost
or belatedly produced because of counsel's failures.' 313
Second, if the duty was breached, was the requested ES! "relevant"? In
Zubulake, the court linked proof of relevance to the culpable state of mind that
led to ESI destruction. Relevance is presumed if the destruction was willful.
14
If the destruction was negligent or inadvertent, however, the party seeking
sanctions is required to show that missing information is relevant "to the party's
claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would
support that claim or defense. 31 5 The "relevance" requirement thus entails a
showing that the destroyed ESI would have been favorable to the movant. 16 if,
as in Zubulake, a court determines that sanctions are authorized because it finds
both a breach of a duty to preserve and the relevance of the destroyed ESI, then
it determines what sanctions are authorized.
i. What sanctions are authorized?
Zubulake recognized that the purpose of imposing discovery sanctions and
"major consideration[s] in choosing an appropriate sanction" are deterrence of
future misconduct, punishment for past misconduct and restoration of the
s3 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V).
314 Id. at 436. "Once the duty to preserve attaches, any destruction of [ESI or ordinary]
documents is, at a minimum, negligent." Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV) (citations omitted).
315 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 430-31; Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 221.
316 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 431.
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injured party.317 For the destruction ofESI, Zubulake cited Rule 37 and courts'
inherent power as guides for fashioning appropriate sanctions."' In light of
Zubulake's particular facts, the court considered an "adverse inference" (that
the destroyed ESI would have been unfavorable to UBS) jury instruction,
payment for depositions or re-depositions and payment for costs of the
sanctions motion itself.319  The court ordered an adverse jury instruction
because ESI was destroyed willfully and not merely negligently. 32 The court
also ordered that UBS pay costs of the motion and depositions and re-
depositions.32'
We suggest that Hawai'i courts draw from Zubulake's insights and also
incorporate the Rule 26(g) range of sanctions for the destruction of ESI-even
prior to litigation and in the absence of signed filings. There are two
overarching rationales for the propriety of Rule 26(g) sanctions for destruction
of ESI. The purpose of Rule 26(g)'s mandate of "an appropriate sanction" is
deterrence of similar discovery misconduct of both attorneys and litigants.322
The rationale for Rule 26(g) fits where, as in Zubulake and most other cases
involving the destruction of ESI, the sanction is intended to deter, not
compensate or punish.323
In addition, the policy and tone of Rule 26(g) is appropriate for sanctions
determinations for the destruction of ESI. The counterpart Rule 11 places an
emphasis on deterrence 324 and provides for "nonmonetary directives; an order
to pay a penalty into court;... an order directing payment to the movant of part
or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting
from the violation." 325 In addition, under Rule 11, a court may "strik[e] the
317 Id. at 437.
318 Zubulake did not cite Rule 37(e), the safe harbor provision, which was added after
Zubulake V.
319 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 431, 436-37.
320 Id. at 437.
321 Id.
322 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note (1983); see FED. R. Civ. P. I 1(c).
323 Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 437; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note (1983).
A creative judge could apply Rule 26(g) directly as authority to impose sanctions for pre-
litigation ESI destruction. If the party seeking ESI submits a Rule 34 request and the opposing
party's attorney responds in writing that the ESI has been "lost," the judge can impose sanctions
under Rule 26(g) for the following reasons. Assuming the "safe harbor" is inapplicable, the
judge could find that the signed "ESI-is-destroyed" response is not reasonably grounded in law
because it reflects the violation of the known duty of preservation. See HAw. R. Civ.
P. 26(g)(2). The range of Rule 26(g) sanctions would then be appropriate.
324 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (stating that "[i]t is now clear
that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings" (citations omitted)); Eric K.
Yamamoto & Danielle K. Hart, Rule 11 and State Courts: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 13 U.
HAw. L. REV. 57, 66-68 (1991).
325 FED. R. Cirv. P. II (c)(4).
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offending paper; issu[e] an admonition, reprimand, or censure; require[e]
participation in seminars or other educational programs; order[] a fine payable
to the court; [and] refer[] the matter to disciplinary authorities .... Further,
sanctions imposed under Rule 11 "must be limited to what suffices to deter
repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated."
327
Similarly, Rule 26(g) determinations of what is "appropriate under the
circumstances" first looks to non-monetary sanctions in light of the deterrent
purpose. a2 s
Hawai'i courts may also draw from Wong v. City & County of Honolulu,
where the non-monetary sanctions imposed were deemed appropriate because
they were "commensurate" with the harm.3 29 The monetary sanctions in some
instances may be warranted by the severity of the breach of the duty to preserve
and the degree of harm. For this, courts may draw from DuPont, where the
defendant faced significant monetary sanctions for ongoing discovery
misconduct that caused severe prejudice to the plaintiffs.33 °
V. CONCLUSION
An e-discovery rules regime is imperative for Hawai'i courts. Based on a
survey of case law, the experience of federal and other states' courts and
recommendations of federal magistrate judges, we suggest that Hawai'i courts
incorporate the new federal e-discovery rules regime into the Hawai'i Rules of
Civil Procedure-albeit with one caveat. This caveat is that Hawai'i
rulemakers (through commentary) and courts (through case pronouncements)
fill in key gaps and clarify ambiguities in the federal approach. To illuminate
our suggestion and the caveat, we first examined the promise and problems of
e-discovery and the federal court and state court responses. We then analyzed
the new rules in detail, identified the gaps and ambiguities and offered specific
correctives.
E-discovery has arrived. The time is right for the Hawai'i courts.
326 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) & (c) advisory committee's note (1993).
327 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(4).
32' FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note (1983).
329 Wong v. City & County of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 389, 394, 665 P.2d 157, 161 (1983).
330 See generally Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agric. Prods., 86 Haw. 214, 948 P.2d
1055 (1997).

